Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 1

Article 6

6-1-1999

Defining the Scope of the Constitutional Right to
Marry: More Than Tradition, Less Than Unlimited
Autonomy
Donald L. Beschle

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donald L. Beschle, Defining the Scope of the Constitutional Right to Marry: More Than Tradition, Less Than Unlimited Autonomy, 70
Notre Dame L. Rev. 39 (1994).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol70/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Defining the Scope of the Constitutional
Right to Marry: More Than Tradition, Less Than
Unlimited Autonomy
Donald L. Beschle"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the recognition of a constitutional right of privacy,' the
scope of that right has been unclear. Consistently, however, it has
been linked in some way to the concept of the family.' At the
core of the modem "right of privacy" are at least limited rights to
make decisions whether to have children,' to educate and otherwise raise those children,4 and to live together with the members
of one's nuclear or extended family.5 Thus, it is unsurprising that
courts and commentators have formed something of a consensus
supporting the existence of a constitutional right to marry.' But

* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Fordham University; J.D.,
New York University School of Law.
1 The constitutional right of privacy is generally regarded as having first been enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Earlier cases spoke of "privacy" as
an aspect of other constitutional rights. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(privacy as part of the First Amendment right of association); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1941) (privacy of reproductive rights as grounds for equal protection strict
scrutiny). But Griswold elevated the notion of a right of privacy to one which stands on
its own.
2 Both the antecedents of Griswold and its subsequent developments are discussed
infra notes 70-122 and accompanying text.
3 See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
4 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute prohibiting the teaching
of foreign languages in primary grades held unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state statute requiring all children to attend public, rather than
private, schools held unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandatory school attendance law could not be applied to Amish who substitute home education
for high school education).
5 See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance could
not prohibit grandmother from living with grandchildren).
6 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624
(1980); John D. Ingram, A Constitutional Critique of Restrictions on the Righi to Many--Why
Can't Fred Many George-Or May and Alice at the Same Time?, 10 J. CONTEMP. L. 33
(1984); Developments in the Lav--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156
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this consensus fragments over the question of whether that right is
limited to the formation of a traditional, monogamous, heterosexual union, theoretically for life, or whether it also includes legal
protection for voluntary arrangements which lack any, or all, of
these features.
At this time, most courts lean toward the narrow view protecting traditional marriage, while most commentators seem to favor
the broader view.' But these sources seem to agree generally that
the question is one which poses a stark choice between complete
government neutrality concerning the nature of the family, on the
one hand, and complete constitutional indifference to government
intrusion into nontraditional living arrangements, on the other.
Each of these positions is seriously flawed. In order to frame
an alternative, however, it is necessary to dissect the concept of a
family, the nature of constitutional rights, and the consequences
for government of the existence of such a right. When we do so,
we will see that none of these is a single, necessarily unitary, idea.
Instead, each can be seen as a collection of related concepts,
often complementary, but not inevitably linked. The ability to
disentangle these "bundles of sticks" can lead to the recognition of
alternative approaches to constitutional protection of the family
which are more satisfactory than either of the currently articulated
options.
Rights have become thoroughly identified with the vindication
of the choices of the autonomous individual. Surely that is an important part of the notion of individual rights, but an exclusive
focus on personal choice may obscure those instances in which
rights against government exist largely to permit individuals to
fulfill duties or commitments to others, rather than to act in a

(1980).
7 See infra notes 68-132 and accompanying text.
8 In 1990, Thomas Grey surveyed law review commentary on the Griswold line of
cases and found that, overwhelmingly, commentators read these cases in a way providing
support for strong libertarian positions. In Grey's opinion, the commentary went far beyond the actual support given in the cases for such positions. Thomas C. Grey, Eros,
Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 83, 98-100 (1980). Since
1980, this trend has generally continued. See supra note 6; see also Claudia A. Lewis, From
This Day Forward: A Feminine Moral Discoume on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783
(1988); G. Keith Nedrow, Polygamy and the Right to Many: New Life for an Old Life.style, 11
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 303 (1981); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law,
102 HARV. L. REv. 1508 (1989). For dissenting academic views, see Bruce C. Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Earl M. Mahz, Constitutional Protection for the
Right to Many: A Dissenting View, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Ru. 949 (1992).
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completely self-regarding manner. The family, as both a social and
legal concept, has evolved in a way which has emphasized its role
in satisfying the needs of its individual members. Surely, this is an
important part of the concept of family, but it may obscure the
extent to which reciprocal duties are also central to the concept.
The first two sections of this article will discuss these two points
and their significance to the right to marry or to form a legally
recognized family. The third part of this article will discuss the
proposition that courts are not limited to the options of refusing
to recognize an individual right, on the one hand, or striking
down every impediment to the exercise of that right, on the other. The emerging notion of "undue burdens" on privacy rights
may provide a useful tool for forging an alternative which may accommodate both core individual rights and legitimate expressions
of social sentiment.
Finally, the principles discussed in these three sections will be
applied to the specific question of the scope of the right to marry.
Both of the most commonly articulated positions, that individuals
outside of traditional family structures have no such right, and
that individuals have the right to complete equality in government
treatment of traditional and nontraditional arrangements, will be
rejected. Instead, it will be argued that individuals have the right
to be free of governmental interference when they seek to obtain
many of the core benefits and take on many of the core duties of
marriage. But they do not have the right to obtain all of the benefits, or all of the formal recognition, that government confers on
preferred family arrangements. Government should be allowed to
promote commitment to others, particularly those commitments
which span generations, and to prefer family arrangements most
likely to further those commitments. Still, even these 'decisions
must be justified by some measure of rational argument, not
merely on the assertion of prevailing distaste.
II.

RIGHTS, FREEDOM, AND COMMITMENT

Modern western notions of human rights arose more or less
simultaneously with the emergence of a consciousness which
placed the human individual at the center of philosophical inquiry.' It is, therefore, not surprising that while discussion of rights

9 Thus, Louis Henkin describes the history of human rights in a chapter which, although explicitly referring to earlier sources in natural law theory, is entitled "The First
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has branched into a number of competing directions, such as
positive and negative rights," and liberty and equality rights,"
all primarily work from a model of the individual asserting a claim
against the collective body. Something might qualify as a right by
virtue of satisfying the individual's articulated desires. 2 But the
welfare of others, and certainly of the community as a whole, does
not appear directly relevant to the definition of rights. Even the
most tyrannous of governments will define its policies in terms of
pursuing the general welfare; thus, to serve as protection against
such policies, rights must be centered in individual choice.
Individual choice, however, need not be separate from the
welfare of others. At the very least, an individual may exercise
individual choice in two ways. A person may choose a course of
action to maximize his or her own welfare. On the other hand, a
person may choose to fulfill an obligation to another. At first
glance, this second type of choice, the choice to fulfill a duty,
seems less consistent with the notion of rights than the first, entirely self-regarding, type of choice. If the obligation which the
individual chooses to fulfill is one imposed by the state, then it
would be disingenuous to speak of this obedience as the exercise
of a right.
Where the obligation arises not from the state, but from a
commitment to a third party, however, an entirely different picture emerges. An individual's choice to fulfill a duty to a third

Two Hundred Years of an Idea." LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 1-30 (1978).
In other words, the Enlightenment inaugurated the "first two hundred years" of the concept. Prior conceptions of natural law may have limited the sovereign's legitimate power,
but the Enlightenment caused a serious shift from duty to egoism. The modem concept
of rights "is individualistic in the sense that it is a from-the-bottom-up view of morality
rather than one from the top down, . . . it generally expresses claims of a part against
the whole." J. Roland Pennock, Rights, Natural Rights, and Human Rights-A General Vierv,
in HUMAN RIGHTS: NoMos XIII I (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1981).
10 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72
(1969); Jan Narveson, Human Rights: Which If Any, Are There, in HuNL-%N RIGHTS: NOMOS
XIII, supra note 9, at 175-97.
11 Thus, Robert Nozick weighs in heavily on the side of liberty; he believes that the
imposition of taxes in order to redistribute income is unjust. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 171-74 (1974). In contrast, equality is at the heart of the influential
work of John Rawls and Bruce Ackerman. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).

12 "Arguments for the value of choice may rely either on the instrumental value of
choices or on the intrinsic value. That is, either the value that attaches to choices because having more choices contributes causally to the obtaining of other good things or
the value that attaches to having more choices for its own sake." GERALD DWORKIN, THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 78 (1988).
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party, in opposition to the wishes of the state, can easily be seen
as the assertion of a right. Indeed, it can be argued that this type
of rights claim has a longer history than a right defined solely in
terms of the self-regarding choice of the individual. While modem
notions of individual rights are largely the product of seventeenth
and eighteenth century thought, 3 the contention that disobedience to the positive law of the state is sometimes justified appears
millennia earlier.
The classic western examples, of course, are biblical. And in
these examples, it is obvious that the ultimate source of the claim
that the state must yield is the individual's sense of duty, not
merely the individual's own desire. Prophets and other heroes
refuse to obey the commands of foreign rulers when they conflict
with God's law;" they also call Israel's own rulers to task. 5 The
tradition carries over into the New Testament, with its martyrs
choosing death over betrayal of God. 6 But such ancient conflicts
are not found only in Jewish or Christian sources. Greek tragedy
gives us the example of Antigone's defiance of Creon. 1 Duty to
the gods and to her brother, not benefit to herself, motivates
Anigone's disobedience of the king's command.
One might contend that an individual choice to fulfill a duty
is merely an example of one type of personal choice, with no
claim to a separate type of analysis. To recognize a distinction
between a choice made to fulfill a duty and a choice made to
secure a benefit, it might be said, will lead to preferring one type
(almost certainly the former) over the other. The ultimate result
may be to disparage individual rights not clearly perceived to have
their source in duty to others. While this is a possible risk, it need

13 See sources cited supra note 9.
14 See e.g., Daniel 3:1-46 (discussing the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach, and AbedNego to obey Nebuchadnezzar's command to worship the golden statue).
15 See, e.g., Isaiah 1:1-31 (lament over Israel's sinfulness).
16 See e.g., Acts 7:1-60 (recounting the stoning of Stephen); Acts 12:1-17 (describing
Herod's persecution of the Christians). The Biblical notion of civil disobedience as a duty
to God was an important strain in the history of American civil disobedience from colonial days through the civil rights movement. See generally CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (David R. Weber ed., 1978).
17 Antigone is willing to face death for burying her brother Polyneices in defiance
of her uncle, King Creon, who had forbidden burial as punishment fo: Polyneices'
treason. Creon's adherence to civic duty over the loyalties commanded by the gods and
Antigone's contrary choice lead to Antigone's death and Creon's remorse. SOPHOCLES,
Antigone, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS: ANTIGONE, OEDIPUS THE KING, OEDIPUS AT
COLONUS (Robert Fagles trans., 1982).
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not be a consequence of recognizing the distinction.
Surely the recognition of individual rights that need no further justification than their potential to promote an individual's
own ends has been enormously positive. But the initial recognition
of the right does not itself determine its scope. Much of constitutional law consists not of argument over whether rights exist at all,
but rather of their proper scope. In defining the scope of rights,
perhaps a "one size fits all" attitude is improper. Each asserted
right must be analyzed in light of its origins and function. In
making this type of inquiry, focusing on the distinction suggested
above between choices to fulfill duties and choices to obtain benefits may be extremely useful.
A number of constitutional rights are clearly designed to protect the individual whether or not his or her choice is entirely
self-centered. Perhaps the most obvious examples are the rights of
criminal defendants. The right against self-incrimination, the right
to counsel, and the right to be free from unreasonable searches
clearly do not exist to enable individuals to fulfill duties to others,
but rather, quite legitimately, to protect their own interests. 8
Other rights, such as the right of free speech or the right to vote,
can be seen as having aspects of both types. One might feel a
duty to speak or vote; 9 one might, conversely, do so for self-re20
garding reasons.

18 Thus, Leonard Levy believes the Fifth Amendment evolved from reaction to the
zealous accusatorial system used to punish heretics in the Middle Ages. The crime itself,
of course, was treason against God and dangerous to the community; thus, the accused
had the duty to speak truthfully about his own guilt. The right to be free from self-incrinination, then, is grounded in the right to stand apart from others. LEONARD W.
LE\Y, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AmENDMENT 342 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, those who adhere to
the "Due Process" model of criminal procedure accept the fact that it will result in the
actually guilty using rules to, sometimes successfully, eAde social responsibility. See, e.g.,
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-73 (1968).
19 The history of the expansion of the First Amendment can be seen as a slow but
steady tolerance of the individual who defies duties to God (the heretic and blasphemer), to the public (the rabble-rouser and pornographer), or to specific individuals (one
who prints libel). See generally IIARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION (Jamie Kalven
ed., 1988). For a history of the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, the first federal
protection for voting rights, see WII.I.IAM GILI.ETrE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND
PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1969).

20 Thus, Alexander Meiklejohn's classic rationale for the protection of free speech as
essential to the community's self-government may be contrasted with theories locating its
value in self-realization and standing apart from others. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).

For an argument that "the ro-

mantic tradition that prizes rebellion and dissent" is central to the understanding of the
right of free speech, see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 7 (1990).
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Thus, in defining the scope of individual rights, the extent to
which one is fulfilling a duty may be of some significance with respect to some rights but not others. One need not accept the
position that the First Amendment was primarily concerned with
political speech to take that position seriously; it seems, at its core,
to contain some aspects of recognition of a right based on a duty-a duty of participation in democratic governance. 2' But to
demand justification of an individual's Fifth Amendment rights in
a sense of duty is patently improper. To recognize the possible
relevance of duty in defining the scope of one right is not to
insist on narrow definitions of rights which are clearly not dependent on a sense of obligation.
The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are products of Enlightenment thought.22 It is not surprising then, to find that most
of the rights created by these documents seem, if not entirely
focused on the self-regarding individual, at least no more protective of rights based in duty than of rights based in self-fulfillment.
Occasionally, though, we may find a right which seems not merely
arguably or partially based in the freedom to fulfill a duty, but
primarily if not exclusively so.
The most obvious example is the Free Exercise Clause. 23 The
story of the religious objector, from the early martyrs, to Luther,
to Bonhoffer, is not one of the individual acting to maximize his

John Thomson, a New York lawyer criticizing the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1801,
viewed the freedom of speech as an extension, in a democracy, of parliamentary immunity from prosecution for debate and deliberation on legislation. DONNA L. DICKERSON,
THE COURSE OF TOLERUNCE: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 6-7

(1990). The dual nature of the right as protecting the individual engaged in the duty of
governing while also protecting his or her own self-interest is obvious. As regards voting
rights, much ink has been spilled in recent years debating the extent to which the constitutional framers hoped or expected that voters would act pursuant to the ideals of
.civic republican" virtue as opposed to self-interest. See generally Symposium, Classical Philosophy and the American Constitutional Order, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3 (199.0).
21 See sources cited supra note 20.
22 "Preoccupation with theology gave way to absorption in politics . . . The European scientific and -intellectual revolution noted earlier quickly reshaped American
views ... . Newton and Locke became the authorities for the changed outlook ....
The notion of rights was transformed by the doctrine that the law of nature was to be
found in human experience . . . ." WINTON U. SOLBERG, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION vi-lvii (2d ed. 1990).
23 "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a thorough and concise discussion of the historical background of the religion clauses, see ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELI-

GION CLAUSES 1-32 (1990).
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or her welfare, but rather one of sacrifice of self-interest and the
assumption of risk or disadvantage out of a powerful sense of
duty.2" Surely, respect for this type of choice, as well as recognition of the cruelty of using state power to coerce betrayal of obligations to an authority beyond government, was a powerful
motive
2 5'
for the inclusion of the clause in the Bill of Rights.

On the surface, the central role of duty in the Free Exercise
Clause has not been prominent in recent case law. To probe too
deeply in the distinction between "I must" and "I want to" in the
context of religion is to risk asking courts to enunciate religious
doctrine, which they are not supposed to do,25 or to question the
sincerity of the individual, something which, while permissible, is
surely not something which courts are eager to do." But even a
quick glance at Free Exercise Clause cases reveals that, not too far
beneath the surface, the more clearly the claimant is heeding the
call of duty at the expense of self, the more likely the claim is to
succeed.
The high point of free exercise, Wisconsin v. Yoder,28 involved
a community which denies itself a wide range of comforts and
conveniences that are regarded by most as desirable.' The specific choice made by the Amish which gave rise to Yoder, to withdraw
their children from the last two years of compulsory free public
education," would appear to most observers to be the renunciation of a good thing. The Amish, by acting in a way which clearly

24 See sources cited supra notes 14-16.
25 See LENT, supra note 18, at 3-42 (discussing the close connection between the
rights of criminal defendants and reaction to religious persecution in pre-revolutionary
Europe).
26 Courts are neither to determine the truth of religious doctrine, United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 (1944), nor are they to determine theological or doctrinal matters in a way which substitutes their judgment for that of church authorities. Serbian E.
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
27 See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 85-87 (permitting a court to question the sincerity of a
defendant accused of fraudulent activity under the cover of religion, but not the underlying truth of his preaching); see also United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983)
(demonstrating that the government may question a religious leader's assertion that income was used for religious, rather than personal, ends and was therefore exempt from
taxation), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
28 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29 Old Order Amish insulate themselves from modern worldly influence, attempting
to live "a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as exemplified by the simple life of
the early Christian era . . . . Amish beliefs require members of the community to make
their living by farming or closely related activities" and eschew "self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life [outside the community]." Id. at 210-11.
30 Id. at 207-08.
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disadvantages them in secular terms, leave little doubt that they
are acting out of a sense of duty. Thus, their claims fit the paradigm of martyrdom (or, at least, sacrifice) and become more sympathetic. Despite Justice Douglas' dissenting concern that the right
to sacrifice oneself does not necessarily lead to the right to sacrifice the secular interests of one's children,"' the Court held that
the state must defer to this countervailing duty. 2
Compare this to classic cases in which free exercise claims
have been rejected. Mormons practicing polygamy,3 Seventh-Day
Adventists using children to do fundraising work, 4 and Native
Americans using peyote in their rituals 3 all share a common
thread. To the nonbelieving observer, all of these claimants may
appear to be seeking some sort of advantage-some sort of benefit
which the nonbeliever might wish to obtain. Even if the sincerity
of the individual claimant is conceded, the fear of people using
the excuse of religious "duty" to demand the right to marry multiple partners, to profit from child labor, or to take illegal drugs
surely is not far below the surface of the Court's rejection of these
claims. On the other' hand, the likelihood that many people will
form simple, rural communities and deny themselves modem comforts under the guise of religion in order to obtain the "benefit"
of withdrawing their children from high school was small enough
to be of little concern. 3 Thus, the concept of an individual right
that exists in order to permit the individual to fulfill a duty rather
than to pursue self-interest seems central to the jurisprudence of
the Free Exercise Clause. Explicit recognition of this may lead to
the rejection of some claims which might be upheld if the point is

31 Id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 234.
33 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (upholding prohibition on polygamy).
34 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding the conviction of a
mother who, with her nine-year-old daughter, publically sold religious literature; a Massachusetts statute prohibited the use of children in selling newspapers or magazines).
35 See Employment Div. v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not compel states to exempt religious use of peyote from statutes prohibiting drug use).
36 Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (permitting Amish to withdraw children from school after eighth grade in conformance with religious belief), with Mozert v.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (prohibiting use of the
Free Exercise Clause to exempt children from reading school books which their parents
deemed offensive to their religious beliefs), cerl. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). In Mozert,
parents claimed the right to select parts of the public school experience; this seems
much more a matter of personal choice than the Amish submission to traditional duty.
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obscured, but it may also lead to a more vigorous clause. To lose
sight of the importance of duty to the Free Exercise Clause may
itself lead to underenforcement, rather than overenforcement, of
the Clause. Indeed, this may already have occurred.
The 1990 Smith decision"l seriously eroded free exercise protection in cases involving statutes of "general application."3 There
is something to be said for the notion that while the religious
believer is entitled to protection from special disadvantage," the
believer should be subject to the same restraints placed on all
others. But, as some have noted, this type of "equal treatment"
may be extremely unequal below the surface." Foregoing consumption of wine will mean, to many, no more than the loss of a
pleasurable dining experience. But when the same prohibition
deprives the individual of access to a sacrament, the impact is of a
far greater magnitude. This impact will be further magnified when
receiving the sacrament is perceived as not merely a privilege, but
as a duty." Similarly, in a broader sense, there may well be a
qualitative difference between acceding to a government command

37 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
38 "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Id at 879
(citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
39 Thus, even Smith noted that the Free Exercise Clause does not permit government to "impose special disabilities on the basis of religious vieus or religious status." Id.
at 877. Where a statute imposed distinctive penalties on religious behavior and was motivated by hostility to the Santeria religion, the Court ias unanimous in striking it down
even in the wake of Smith. Church of Lukumi Bakalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993).
40 Justice Souter, concurring in Church of Lukumi, was critical of the Smith formulation on this ground, stating that "formal neutrality" is different than "substantive neutrality." Church of Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2241-42 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Douglas
Laycock, Formal, Substantive and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAULL L. REV.
993 (1990)). These criticisms of Smith have had an effect in the political arena. President
Clinton recently signed into law the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988,
2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. 1994)). Under Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to
enforce civil rights, the Act declares that the Yoder strict scrutiny test is to be applied in
Free Exercise cases. This may not reverse the narrow holding of Smith; Justice O'Connor
applied strict scrutiny in her concurring opinion and nonetheless upheld the statute.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41 The Catholic church has long considered participation in the Eucharist to be the
very core of a believer's religious life. See Michael Henchal, Sunday Assemblies in the Absence of a Paiest, 49 JuRIST 607, 619-624 (1989). And canon law does not treat lightly the
requirement that wine, not grape juice, be used. See John M. Huels, 47 JURIST 605
(1987) (reviewing PATRICK J. MCSHERR', WINE AS A SACRAMENTAL MATTER AND THE USE
OF MUSTUM (1986)).
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overriding individual choice of a benefit to oneself and acceding
to a command overriding individual choice to fulfill a duty to
another.
The relevance of this to the question of family and marriage
rights might be questioned. Owing to its unique history and characteristics, the Free Exercise Clause may be sui generis, perhaps all
other constitutional rights can be fully analyzed without exploring
the motivation behind the exercise of each right. But perhaps the
distinction between a choice to fulfill a duty and a choice to benefit only oneself may be useful elsewhere. To what extent should
the concept of family and the right to form and maintain families
be seen as matters of self-regarding choice, and to what extent are
they matters of duties beyond the self?
III.

FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND COMMITMENT

Much popular discussion of the family takes as its reference
point the twentieth century, middle-class, American family of husband, wife, and children born to those two parents. The observation that millions live in different types of arrangements4 2 does
not threaten the status of the two-parent nuclear family as a popular reference point. Call it nostalgia, but most of us would instinctively like to live in something like the idealized 1950s television
household, perhaps modified only to make husband and wife
more equal and to allow the wife to pursue a career."
A vast amount of writing has established, however, that the
nature of the family and the social conventions surrounding marriage have changed over time, even if we limit our inquiry to the
Anglo-American experience. The relevant unit for the concept of
family has included not only the nuclear family, but the extended
kin group, and an even broader group encompassing one's lineage back and forward over time-the dead and those yet unborn. ' Similarly, conceptions of the primary function of the fami-

42

See Nan D. Hunter, Child Support Law and Polity: The Systematic Imposition of Costs

bn Women, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1983). Where two spouses are present, one may not
be the parent of the children, given the rate of divorce and remarriage. See WILLIAM

J.

GOODE, WORLD CHANGES IN DIVORCE PATTERNS 135-82 (1993). And, of course, it is now

common for both parents to work outside the home. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD:

CHILD CARE,

WOMEN'S RIGHTS,

AND

THE

MYrH OF THE

GOOD

MOTHER 1-25 (1993).

43 For a critique of the "Ozzie and Harriet" family model, see STEPHANIE COONTZ.,
THE WAY WE. NEVER WERE 23-41 (1992).
44 Thus, Lawrence Stone stresses the importance of careful definition and points out
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ly have shifted between economic and emotional.45 Family strucfrom authoritarian and patriarchal to
tures have varied
"companionate."46 All of this is further complicated by the coexistence of various forms at a single time and disagreement over
whether clear trends are apparent. Thus, it is widely believed that
the last four hundred years have seen a clear trend from extended
to nuclear families, and from the family as primarily an economic
unit to the family as a source of emotional satisfaction. 7 Yet
some scholars question this, asserting that the nuclear family was
central even centuries ago and that earlier families were not lacking in emotional commitment.4 8
When we look at the more narrow question of how marriages
are entered into, again we see a range of approaches taken in
Anglo-American society over the centuries. Near total control by
parents over marriage choices by their children, an initial choice
of partner by a child subject to parental veto, and today's norm of
near total control of the choice of one's own marriage partner
have each been common. 9 Legal and social norms regarding the
appropriate age of marriage and what degree of consanguinity
would act as a barrier to marriage have varied."

the different terms with which "family" may be thought synonymous, including "lineage,"
"kin," "household," and "marriage." LA.WRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN
ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 28-36 (abr. ed. 1979). The relative importance of these various
conceptions of family has changed over time. Id.
45 Mary Ann Glendon has traced the changes in the extent to which the family (kin
or marriage), as opposed to nonfamily relationships such as employment or government
programs, has been significant in property and economic matters. In general, she sees a
trend in which the noneconomic, "companionate" aspects of marriage have grown, while
economic and property questions have tended to shift outside the family. MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE NEW FA,\iII.Y AND THE NEW PROPERTY 1-8 (1981).

46 Lawrence Stone sees the "open lineage family" of 1450-1630 giving way to the "restricted patriarchal nuclear family" of 1550-1700, which in turn gives way to the "closed
domesticated nuclear family" of 1620-1800. STONE, supra note 44. The "companionate
marriage" gained in ascendancy through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
GLENDON, supra note 45, at 12-46.

47 This is the fundamental conclusion of Lawrence Stone, supra note 44, at 407-22.
Philippe Aries reaches a similar conclusion; his work is best known for its conclusion that
before the nineteenth century, high infant mortality led to the absence of strong parental love for their children: "People could not allow themselves to become too attached to
something that was regarded as a probable loss." PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 38 (1962).
48 See, e.g., FERDINAND MOUNT, THE SUBVERSIVE. FAMILY: AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF

THE FAMILY (1992) (arguing that the nuclear family has a very long history and is derived from biology).
49 See STONE, supra note 44, at 181-216.
50

See, e.g., FRANCES GIES & JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND THE FA,\mLY IN THE MIDDLE

AGES 83-88 (1987).
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The vast diversity of opinion and experience as to what families are, what they do, and who may form them makes it difficult
to delineate an acceptable notion of family-based rights. What
kind of family is the reference point: the family at the time of the
framers, the family over most of American history, the family as it
exists today, or the family regarded as ideal by most Americans,
regardless of empirical data? The choice of one model will have
enormous consequences, not only for what that model excludes,
but also what it includes. If the family which one has the right to
form is the Anglo-American family of (for example) 1787, it not
only means that polygamous or same-sex marriages are outside the
scope of protection, but it also may mean that the right of the
father to exercise unlimited authority within the family is entitled
to constitutional respect.5' Is the only alternative to reject any
notion of an objective norm for the family entitled to protection,
maintaining that individuals must be entirely free to construct
families in any way they choose and that all choices must be
treated equally by government?
The various forms taken by the family caution against eas' endorsement of any particular model as uniquely entitled to legal
protection, but it would seem to be too much of a concession to
abandon any notion of some essential core of family. A rather
obvious starting point would be to recognize that a family requires
some sort of interpersonal relationship, even if only a dyad. On its
face, this would seem to be an innocuous starting point, but it is
of some significance. The lone individual cannot be a family.
This may seem obvious, but some years ago, a White House
conference on the family was asked to accept the notion of family
as including single individuals living alone. 2 Family, under this
view, is a concept indistinguishable from household. In the politi-

51 See Jay Einhom, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A Study of Changing Social
Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-American Lan, 4 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 119,
123-28 (1986); Henry H. Foster & Doris Freed, Life ith Father: 1978, 11 FAxt. L.Q. 321,
325-26 (1978).
52 Of course, for some purposes a single individual is the equivalent of a family. For
example, "single family" zoning ordinances permit occupancy by a single individual. See,
e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S, 1 (1974); Carroll v. City of Miami Beach,
198 So.2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The family-also serves as an economic unit. See
generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 801, 81218 (1989). In this respect, a single-person household is the equivalent of a family. For an
argument against excluding single people, including those who live alone, from legal
protection given to "families," see Jennifer Jamf, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in American Law, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 207 (1988).
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cal arena, surely it is permissible to argue that government policy
should not ignore the welfare of single-person households, but
when the task is to frame constitutional rights, including these
households as families has the potential to confuse notions which
should be distinct.
Obviously, the single individual has a range of constitutionally
protected privacy and autonomy rights. 3 The birth control cases,
particularly those dealing with unmarried people," firmly establish that among these autonomy rights is the right to avoid forming unwanted family ties. And it seems beyond dispute that the
individual who chooses such an option need not justify it in any
terms beyond self-interest. Thus, to recognize that the consequences of choosing to enter an interpersonal relationship are different
from the consequences of avoiding one is not to deny the existence of autonomy rights which might be exercised solely out of
self-interest. It is merely to recognize that the notion of family and
the notion of autonomy are, to some extent, distinct.
An interpersonal relationship may be entered into for any
mixture of selfish or altruistic reasons, of course. The other individual may be seen entirely as a means to one's selfish ends, and
no doubt this may be true in family relationships as well as more
casual or transient ones. But the undoubted existence of family
relationships formed solely to satisfy selfish desires should not prevent our next analytical step in defining the concept of family.
The interpersonal relationship of family is one in which at least
the mature members assume commitment to the welfare of those
with whom they share the relationship. There is, in other words, a
significant degree of altruism, or (if that is too strong a word for
a cynical age) at least an understanding of mutuality. One's satisfaction is directly tied to that of another. Even those who fall far
short of this altruism in their actual lives at least give lip service to
it. Marriage vows, even in an age of frequent divorce, do not
speak in the harsh language of contract law where performance is
conditioned upon full consideration, but in the language of openended duty.
All families are interpersonal relationships, but not all inter-

53

See generally DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL

(1992). The subtitle alone suggests the degree to which privacy and autonomy rights are grounded in the indihidual.
54 See Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Sen's., 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
RIGHT: SEx, DRUGS AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE
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personal relationships are families. While family structures vary
over time and place, the norm for recognizing a family invariably
seems to include some sort of intergenerational aspect. This does
not mean that a unit without children or elders cannot be designated a family.55 The intergenerational nature of a. particular family may be merely potential. Additionally, a society may include
within its concept of family some units without real
intergenerational potential. 6 But these latter cases will not be
seen as the norm. The idea of family is closely tied to actual or
potential intergenerational concerns. This might mean a sense that
the interests of all those currently living, of whatever age, are
subordinate to the flourishing of the family lineage over time."
In more recent times and in more familiar places, it will mean a
focus on the parent-child relationship. 8 Family is always a social
concept and often a religious concept as well.59 It is important to
remember that we are primarily concerned with the family as a
legal concept. If intergenerational concerns are central to the
family as a social concept, they seem even more central to the
family as a legal concept. State involvement in defining and regulating families has overwhelmingly touched on intergenerational
matters: the transmission of wealth, the duty to care for children,

55 Of course, there always have been childless couples, either by choice or due to
other factors. Interestingly enough, statistics going back to the late eighteenth century
show that childlessness has not increased since 1870, although the average number of
children in a family has decreased. Decreasing birthrates, therefore, are more a matter of
fewer large families than more childless families. SAR A. LEVTAN & RIcHARD S. BELOUS,
WT HAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMERIcAN FAMILY? 49-56 (1981).
56 The fact that elderly people may marry and that people who cannot have biological children are not prohibited from marrying is frequently cited in legal literature to
refute the notion that the essential link between marriage and procreation bars homosexual marriage. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 6, at 46-47; Otis R. Damslet, Note, Same-Sex
Maniage 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuN. RTS. 555, 567 (1993).
57 "It was precisely this relation of the individual to his lineage which provided a
man of the upper classes in a traditional society with his identity, without which he was
a mere atom floating in a void of social space." STONE, supra note 44, at 29. Rules such
as primogeniture were aimed at maximizing the welfare of the lineage over time, not
merely the welfare of those living in the present.
58 But even the nuclear family with children may be losing ground to the husbandwife relationship. See GLENDON, supra note 45, at 13.
59 Authors Frances Gies, Joseph Gies, and Lawrence Stone frequently note the interaction between church norms regarding marriage and social and legal norms. GElS &
GELS, supra note 50; STONE, supra note 44. By no means did the state always follow
church teaching, but the interplay was significant. For a discussion of the impact of different theological conceptions of marriage upon law, see John Witte, Jr., The Reformation
of Marriage Law in Martin Lutlhr's Germany: Its Significance Then and Now, 4 J.L. & REIIGION 293 (1986).
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the power to discipline children, and related matters. 6' Indeed,
one might wonder if, in a world in which these matters did not
involve parents, the law would be particularly interested in the
ways in which adults chose to arrange their households. If children were universally conceived and born in a laboratory and
raised by the state or by corporate entities, would there be a recognizable body of family law?
When the intergenerational aspect of family is introduced, the
central importance of duty in the ideal of the family, even if not
invariably in the empirical reality, becomes even more prominent
than it was when family was limited to two or more adults. Obviously, this is due to the radical dependence of the infant and
small child upon adult care. Much legal attention must be paid to
families who ignore their duties and abuse or exploit their children to their own selfish ends.6 Little if any support could be
mustered for the assertion that the right of family privacy protects
parents when they consciously abuse or neglect their children. 2
This further proves that the argument for a notion of family rights
is linked to the notion of obligation, not merely self-regarding
autonomy. The courts are sympathetic to claims by parents that
they have the right to take actions which appear harmful to their
children when the parents can demonstrate a sincere belief that
they are acting out of duty.6" Thus, the Christian Scientist's claim
of a right to prefer prayer to cure his child, even if ultimately
rejected, 4 is taken far more seriously than a parent's claim that
medical care would cost money which the parent would rather
spend elsewhere.
It is also worth noting that, at least to some degree, the interests of parents in assuming duties to children and the interests of
children in assuming duties to elderly or infirm parents are consis-

60 Of course, the state need not be actively involved; it may simply delegate power
to one or both parents. See sources cited supra note 51; see also GLENDON, supra note 45,
at 47-97 (discussing the history of the legal duties of family support).
61

See Eu.IzABETH JANE KEMMER, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRA-

P-n' (1984) (listing over 1000 articles published from 1960-1982).
62 Of course legal rules have often consciously or unconsciously permitted such
abuse. See H.CJ. Olmesdahl, Paternal Pouwer and Child Abuse: An Historical and Cross-Cultural
Study, in FA.nIIIY VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAl. AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY 253-68 (John
Eekelaar & Sanford Katz eds., 1978).
63 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text; Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108
(Del. 1991).
64 See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
905 (1989).
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tent with state interests. If for no other reason, these interests are
consistent because if these tasks are not undertaken by individual
families, they will fall to the community at large. The interplay
between family and community responsibility has been noted by
observers in many contexts, including historians who note the
relationship between infanticide, illegitimacy, and the availability or
absence of publicly supported orphanages.65 Mary Ann Glendon
has observed that as the ties of family become weaker in twentieth
century American law, the ties of employment and state-provided
welfare programs become stronger.6 6 The congruence of state
interests with individual interests may not be an argument for
recognizing those individual interests as rights, since our understanding of rights is that they are asserted against the state." But
this congruence will be worth remembering when we analyze the
balancing necessary to determine the scope of family rights.
This brief discussion of the nature of the family is obviously
inadequate to explore the variety of forms taken by the family or
the range of social and legal responses made by different societies
at different times. A huge amount of literature addresses these
questions. But our purpose is otherwise. Without denying the
variety of approaches to family, can we locate a core? It would
appear that we can and that the core can be rather simply stated
as a sense of commitment and duty to another or a group of
others, transcending duty to the community at large. In its actual
manifestations, family will include much self-regarding, even exploitative behavior in many cases, but the ideal is one of caring,
and it is this ideal which gives rise to the claim of special constitutional protection for family rights. Individuals have autonomy
rights which can be exercised for entirely selfish reasons, with no
reference to duty, and this is equally true of individuals who belong to families. But if there are special rights which hinge on the

65

See JACQUES DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES 26-32 (1979) (discussing the

interrelationship between family and community responsibility in nineteenth century
France). The debate over the social effect of a compassionate system of social welfare is
by no means unique to twentieth century America.
66 "Family law reflects this movement in that legal ties among family members are
becoming attenuated . . . . Employment law, on the other hand, reflects the increased
importance of the job . . . . Similarly, in social welfare law, support claims against government are made a matter of right while . . . family support claims are becoming less
so." GLENDON, supra note 45, at 7.
67 The hornbook rule requiring "state action" for a violation of constitutional rights
is discussed in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrTIONAL LAW §§ 18-1 to -7 (2d ed.
1988).
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existence or potential existence of a family, the notion of duty is
crucial.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

The right to form and maintain a family has'evolved over
decades in Supreme Court opinions dealing with a range of family-related issues. To a large extent, the centrality of the family to
people's lives has been so obvious that little elaboration was necessary. However, the legal consequences of the importance of the
family have not been entirely consistent. Ironically, the Court's
first affirmation of the importance of marriage had no libertarian
connotations at all. In Maynard v. Hill,' the Court was asked to
assess the validity of divorce legislation passed by the territorial
legislature of Oregon under enabling legislation by Congress empowering the territory to act "upon [any] rightful subject of legislation."69
To the Supreme Court, the importance of marriage was a
reason supporting, not limiting, government involvement:
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people
than any other institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at which
parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form essential
to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its
effects upon the property rights of both, present and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution ....

7o

[Marriage] is an institution, in the maintenance of

which its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.7
The first suggestions that the importance of the family relationship might limit government power came in two cases from
the 1920s, each involving the education of children. In Meyer v.

68 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
69 Id. at 203. The divorce legislation was a private bill, dissolving only the marriage
of D.S. and Lydia Maynard. Id. at 192. During and prior to the nineteenth century, the
legislature often granted divorces; general statutes giving courts the power to grant divorces were a nineteenth century innovation. LNNNE C. HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPEC.crTEs 18-21 (1980).
70
71

Aaynard, 125 U.S. at 205.
Id. at 211.
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Nebraska,2 the Court struck down a state statute which prohibited
the teaching of any modem language other than English and the
teaching of any subject in any language other than English until
after the eighth grade." The brief opinion sets forth an amalgam
of freedom of contract, First Amendment and other concerns, and
also broadly states that the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes "the right of the individual... to marry,
establish a home and bring up children .

. . ."'

The Court held

that prohibiting the teaching of modern languages would interfere
with "the power of parents to control the education of their
own." 75 With the same brief reasoning, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisteri6 struck down Oregon's attempt to require all children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public, rather than private, schools.7
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,78 the brief statements that "the right
to have offspring"7 9 is "one of the basic civil rights of man""
and that "[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race"8 justified the application of
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
struck down a statute requiring sterilization of anyone convicted
two or more times of most "felonies involving moral turpitude." 2

72 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
1
73 "No person ... shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school,
teach any subject to any person in any language other than the English language ....
Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a
pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade ....
" Id. at 397
(citing NEB. STAT. ch. 249 (1919)).
74 Id.at 399.
75 Id. at 401. The case may be read as having less to do with family rights than
with economic rights; the Court also defends the right of language teachers to practice
their profession.
76 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
77 "The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
78 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79 Id. at 541.
80 Id. at 536.
81 Id. at 541.
82 Id. at 536. The petitioner had been convicted twice of robbery with firearms and
once of stealing chickens. All three convictions predated the enactment of the statute;
proceedings were brought to secure sterilization while he was imprisoned for the second
armed robbery. The only issue for the jury was whether the sterilization could be performed "without detriment to his general health." Id. at 537.
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The vigor of at least some of these early cases might have been
suspect in light of the decline of strong notions of substantive due
process which prevailed from the turn of the century until the late
1930s." But the 1960s saw a strong revival of constitutional protection of marriage and the family. Justice Douglas's opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticu'"focused on "notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship"'' " in invalidating state statutes restricting access to contraceptives. "We deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights .

. .

. Marriage is coming together

for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life[,] . . . a harmony in living[,] .

.

. a bilateral loyalty." 6

Concurring justices quoted from an earlier opinion by Justice
Harlan to advocate protection of marriage, but also to draw a
distinction between marriage and other intimate relationships:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies
which the State forbids .

.

. but the intimacy of husband and

wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must
allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and
protected.
But later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird," the Court overturned a statute which limited access to contraceptives by unmarried persons,
holding it to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court stressed that freedom from "governmental intrusion" into
"the decision whether to bear or beget a child" was an individual
right, not one solely linked to marriage.8 ' Roe v. Wade' and subsequent cases9' reaffirmed the primacy of the individual. Rights

83 For a discussion of the rise and fall of substantive due process in the first half of
the twentieth century, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL. REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
84 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85 Id. at 486.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Goldberg summed
up his concurrence with the statement that "the right of privacy in the marital relation is
fundamental and basic . . . ." Id.
88 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
89 Id. at 453. "It is true that in Griswold the right of priacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." Id.
90 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
91 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (clarifying that parents could not
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"relating to marriage,. . . procreation, . . . contraception, ....
family relationships ... [and] child rearing and education""2

were components of a "personal" right of privacy."
These cases focused primarily on the potential parent-child
relationship. Marriage itself was the subject in Loving v. Virginia,4
in which the Court invalidated a state ban on interracial marriage.
The Court first held the statute unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause and then briefly added that "[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."95 Thus,
the statute also violated the Due Process Clause."
A somewhat more extensive discussion of the scope of the
right to marry was set forth in Zablocki v. RedhaiL97 The Court
invalidated a Wisconsin statute requiring court approval for the
marriage of anyone subject to a court order to provide child support. The statute required a court to determine whether the applicant was in compliance with the support order and whether the
applicant's children were or were likely to become "public charges.""a The statute was challenged by an unemployed indigent who
was unable to make support payments for the child that he had
fathered out of wedlock. He had been denied the right to marry a
woman with whom he was now expecting another child.' Reviewing cases from Maynard to Roe, the Court noted that "the right to
marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.""° Interestingly,
the Court suggested that the right to marry might not be primary,
but rather derivative of procreation rights:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed

have an absolute veto over their children's decision to have an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down provision giving a husband the
power to block his wife's abortion).
92 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
93 Id.Contrast Justice Blackmun's formulation of the right of "personal privacy" in
Roe, id. at 152, with Justice Goldberg's interpretation in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 499 (1965) ("[Tlhe right of prixacy in the marital relation is fundamental and basic . . . .") (Goldberg, J., concurring).
94 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
95 Id. at 12.
96 Id.
97 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
98 Id.at 375.
99 Id.at 378-79.
100 Id.at 384.
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on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the
facts of this case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family
life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society.'
But the Court added a significant cautionary note:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which
relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary,
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with
decisions to enter into the marital felationship may legitimately
be imposed.'
The Court distinguished Redhail from the earlier case of
Califano v. Jobst' ° in which the Court upheld provisions of the
Social Security Act that terminated benefits to a dependent child
when that child married anyone not entitled to such benefits. 4
"The Social Security provisions," wrote the Court in Redhail,
"placed no direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to
get married, and . . . there was no evidence that the laws significantly discouraged, let alone made 'practically impossible,' any
marriages.""0 5 The statute in Redhail, by contrast, actually prevented marriages and at the same time only indirectly advanced its
goal of assuring support of children.'

101

Id. at 386.

102 Id.
103 434 U.S. 47 (1977). Jobst was argued on the same day as Redhail, but the decision
preceded Redhail by three months.

104 The Act stated:
Every child . . . of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits . . . if such child . . . at the time such application was filed was unmarried

and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and
had not attained the age of 22, or (ii) is under a disability .. .shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month . . .ending with the month
preceding whichever of the following first occurs ...
(D) the month in which
such child dies or marries ....
Id. at 48 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970)).
105 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 n.12 (1978). Thus, "[t]he directness and
substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry distinguish [Redhail] from
Califano v.Jobst." Id. (citation omitted).
106
First, with respect to individuals who are unable to meet the statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without
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In Turner v. Sa,ey,107 the Court reaffirmed "that the decision
to marry is a fundamental right,"'0 8 but also that it was not an
unlimited right. Specifically, the Court examined a Missouri prison
regulation which gave prison officials the power to withhold permission to marry from any inmate unless the inmate could show
compelling reasons for permitting the marriage.1° In practice,
permission was generally granted only in cases where the woman
was already pregnant."' The Court held that the regulation was
not reasonably related to penological objectives; there were "obvious, easy alternatives ...

that accommodate the right to marry

while imposing a de minimis burden on the pursuit of security
objectives.""'
In response to the state's threshold argument that the right to
marry was inapplicable in the prison environment, the Court,
while conceding that incarceration would justify substantial regulation, found that marriage could be of substantial importance to
inmates:
First, inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are an
important and significant aspect of the marital relationship. In
addition, many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual
significance; for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith
as well as an expression of personal dedication. Third, most

delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior children .... Given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the
applicant's financial situation, by contributing income from a job or otherwise,
the statute in many cases may prevent affected individuals from improving their
ability to satisfy their prior suppbrt obligations. And . . . preventing the marriage
may only result in the children being born out of wedlock . . . . Since the support obligation is the same whether the child is born in or out of wedlock, the
net result of preventing the marriage is simply more illegitimate children.
Id. at 389-90.
107 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
108 Id. at 95.
109 Id. at 82.
110 Il
111 Id. at 98. The Court suggested as an alternative the approach of federal prison
authorities, codified at 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986), under which marriage by inmates is
generally permitted unless the warden finds "a threat to security or order of [the] institution, or to public safety." Id. at 98. The standard of review applied by the Court was less
than strict scrutiny, despite the existence of a fundamental right, because of a general
approach in prisoner's rights cases which gives deference to the judgment of prison authorities. Id. at 84-91.
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inmates eventually will be released by parole or commutation,
and therefore most inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be fully consummated. Finally,
marital status often is a precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security benefits), property rights
(e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), and other less
tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of
112
wedlock).
Thus, while its scope may be uncertain, it seems well established that there is some sort of constitutionally protected right to
marry and to establish a family. This quote from Turner is the
most comprehensive statement by the Supreme Court of the interests that the right seeks to protect. At the same time, a parallel
line of precedent has limited these family rights to units resembling traditional families. Thus, although the full consummation of
a marriage is an element to be protected, the Court has found no
fundamental right involved when a state prohibits homosexual
sodomy."1 ' Such activity, unlike heterosexual activity involved in
cases such as Eisenstadt and Griswold, has no procreative significance. This, along with a long history of government disapproval,
held the Court, would remove homosexual relationships from the
scope of due process protection."' While zoning restrictions prohibiting extended family members from living together were subjected to strict scrutiny and invalidated," 5 no such protection was
provided to unrelated groups of more than two adults." 6 Family
rights, in short, are of a different order than merely "[t]he choice
of household companions.""' 7
Even blood relationships, if not traditionally protected by
society, may not be afforded protection. In Caban v. Mohammed,"' the Court struck down a New York provision that permit-

112

Id. at 95-96.

113 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
114

Id. at 191-94.

115 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The ordinance contained "an
unusual and complicated definitional section that recognizes as a 'family' only a few categories of related individuals." Id. at 496. Mrs. Moore lived with an adult son; that son's
son; and Mrs. Moore's other grandson, the child of Mrs. Moore's deceased daughter.
This unit did not qualify as a "family" under the ordinance.
116 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The ordinance was challenged
by a group of six unrelated college students sharing a house.
117

This was Justice Marshall's characterization of the right asserted in Belle Terre. Id.

at 16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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ted unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, to prevent adoption of
their children by withholding consent." 9 Caban objected to the
adoption of his children by their mother's new husband; this
would have terminated Caban's paternal rights and obligations. By
finding that the provision of an absolute veto to unwed mothers,
but not unwed fathers, was impermissible gender discrimination,
the Court strengthened, to some extent, the legal position of
biological fathers. 2
But in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 2' the Court upheld
California's statutory presumption that a woman's husband was the
father of any child born to her when she and her husband were
living together; this presumption could be challenged only in
limited circumstances, and even then only by the woman or her
husband. 22 Thus, a man whose blood tests demonstrated that he
was almost certainly the child's father was prevented from establishing paternity. The Court rejected the argument that the Due
Process Clause protected all biological relationships. Instead, it was
held to protect only "traditionally respected relationships," 2 ' primarily "the marital family" and "the household of unmarried parents and their children," but not the relationship between a biological father and the child of a woman living with her husband.2 4 The dissenters would have found a constitutionally protected interest, one arising not merely from biology, but from

119 "[C]onsent to adoption shall be required as follows: ...
(b) Of the parents or
surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; [and] (c) Of the
mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock ....
" Id. at 385 (citing
N.Y. DONt. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977)).
120 "The effect of New York's classification is to discriminate against unwed fathers
even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant parental interest
in the child . . . . Section 111 both excludes some loving fathers from full participation
in the decision whether their children will be adopted and, at the same time, enables
some alienated mothers arbitrarily to cut off the paternal rights of fathers . . . . (Tihis
undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers ...
does not
bear a substantial relationship to the state's asserted interests." Id. at 394.
121 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
122 Id. at 113.
123 Id. at 123 n.3. The earlier cases "rest not upon . . . isolated factors [such as
biology or an established parent-child relationship] but upon the historic respect-indeed,
sanctity would not be too strong a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family." Id. at 123.
124 "Perhaps the concept can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear no
resemblance to traditionally respected relationships-and will thus cease to'have any constitutional significance-if it is stretched so far as to include the relationship established
between a married woman, her lover, and their child during [two periods totaling eleven
months]." Id. at 123 n.3.
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biology combined with "sufficient commitment to . .. paternity by
way of personal, financial or custodial responsibilities ...."'
To summarize the current state of Supreme Court precedent,
constitutional protection has been extended to the decision whether to bear children and, to a more limited extent, to the right of
parents to make decisions concerning their children's upbringing
and education. A "right to marry" has been recognized, but that
right has thus far been limited to the right to be free of obstacles
to entering a traditional marriage. Family and marriage rights have
not been extended to require state recognition of nontraditional
couples or groups of people as marriages or families. Thus, neither tradition nor an overarching commitment to individual autonomy entirely explains the current state of the law. Tradition would
hardly seem to support abortion rights or the right, at least as
extended to unmarried persons, to obtain contraceptives. But a
strong commitment to individual autonomy surely would call for
protection of homosexual relationships and a far different approach to cases such as Michael H.. It seems likely, of course, that
the current state of the law was not intended to vindicate one
coherent theory; the status quo is largely the result of the clash of
antithetical theories which each command majorities at different
times in different cases. But it is also possible that the failure of
either the autonomy model or the traditional model to prevail
consistently demonstrates that neither is fully adequate to explain
the nature and scope of family and marriage rights.
Despite the presence of constitutional questions in these cases,
family law issues have long been regarded as primarily within the
jurisdiction of state courts.1 2 1 It is unsurprising, then, that the
existence and scope of family rights will largely be litigated in
state courts, with state statutes and constitutional provisions as
prominent as their federal counterparts. State courts and legisla-

125
126

Id. at 158 (White, J., dissenting).

Family law has traditionally been the domain of state government. When the
Constitution was written, it was the common understanding that the states, not
the federal government, would regulate domestic relations. None of the powers
granted the central government was regarded as conferring any authority on
Congress to invade a realm that had alwvays been regulated by state law.
EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMIIY 27 (1986). Herbert Jacob

notes that the radical changes in divorce law during recent decades have been exceptional in that "[n]cither national politicians nor Congress played a part in their adoption.
No bureaucracy or national interest group promoted them." HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAw IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1988).
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tures have taken various approaches to parent-child issues.1 27 For
our purposes, the most significant type of inquiry would be the
right to establish a recognized parent-child tie apart from biology
or traditional marriage. Most, but not all, states have been extremely cautious in allowing a nonbiological or nontraditional
parent to be recognized as legally entitled to assert parental rights
over the objection or to the detriment of traditional, biological
parents.128 Where there are no such problems, states are nevertheless still divided over the right of adults to assume, through
adoption, the role of parents when those2 adults are unmarried or
involved in nontraditional relationships.1 1
With respect to the marriage relationship, there is something
closer to consensus at the state level. Several states have extended
certain rights which normally accompany the marriage relationship
to nontraditional partners, either by legislation or court decision. 3 ' But almost all states have refused to take the full step of
recognizing nontraditional relationships as "marriages." With the
recent exception of Hawaii, 3 ' states have refused to apply strict
scrutiny to statutes that limit marriage to heterosexual couples.'32
Bigamy statutes and prohibitions on other forms of polygamy have
not been successfully challenged, 3 nor have state restrictions on
marriages of blood relatives.3 4 Thus, at the state level, the same
127 See generally BERRY, supra note 42. For a thorough overview of the parent-child
relationship after divorce, see ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING
THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DII.EMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992). For a history of state intervention into the parent-child relationship, see JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1991).
128 See Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption,
22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (1989); Teanna West Neskora, Comment, The Constitutional
Rights of Putative Fathers Recognized in Louisiana's New Children's Code, 52 LA. L. REV. 1009
(1992); R. Michael Otto, Comment, ."Wait 'Til Your Mothers Get Home'" Assessing the Rights
of Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 881.
129 See sources cited supra note 128; see also Carrie Bashaw, Comment, Protecting Children in Nontraditional Families: Second Parent Adoptions in Washington, 13 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REV. 321 (1990); Joseph Evall, Sexual Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L. Q.
347 (1991); Note, Joint Adoption: A Queer Option?, 15 VT. L. REV. 197 (1990).
130 See Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplac 51 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1067 (1990); Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WNM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 539 (1991); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Maniage, and the Same-Sex
Couple 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 681 (1990).
131 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
132 The cases are collected in Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons
of the Same Sex, 63 A.L.R.3d 1199 (1975).
133 See, e.g., Penelope W. Saltzman, Note, Potter v. Murray City: Another Interpretation of
Amendment, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 345.
Polygamy and the First
134 See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Maniage: Is Oedipus
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general picture prevails regarding marriage and family rights as at
the federal level. Neither the autonomy model nor the traditional
model fully explains these state decisions, and this is so not only
when one compares states, but also often within a single state's
law. Once again, this can be seen as merely a matter of each side
prevailing in different places at different times, but perhaps there
is an underlying coherence to the apparent inconsistency.
The position that the right to marry includes the right to
form nontraditional family units which must be given equal legal
status to traditional marriages has received little support in the
courts. But it has attracted some scholarly support, and if the
number of articles published is an accurate measure, this support
seems to be growing.'
These commentators generally begin
from the proposition that since marriage is a fundamental right,
any limitation upon it, even one which limits by defining the
term, must be subject to strict scrutiny.
Since, almost invariably, defenders of the traditional scope of
the family will base their arguments upon the role of the family in
procreation and nurturance of children, critics will point to the
facts that a nontrivial number of traditional marriages are contracted by people unwilling or unable to procreate and that a
nontrivial number of people in nontraditional relationships wish to
raise, if not to bear, children. 3 ' Thus, the traditional definition
of marriage and the family will be found both under-inclusive and
3 7 With proover-inclusive, thereby failing to satisfy strict scrutiny."
creative concerns put aside, the justifications for marriage must
turn to mutual support, a goal which can be reached just as well
in nontraditional as in traditional settings. Therefore, this line of
argument concludes, prohibitions on homosexual marriage must
fall, 3 and in all likelihood so must prohibitions on polygamy'
and at least some forms of incestuous marriages between competent, consenting adults. 4 '
There has been some response to this position in recent legal

Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257 (1984).
135 Every one of the commentators cited in notes 128-34, supra, favors liberalization
of current law. See also supra notes 6-8.
136 See, e.g., Damslet, supra note 56, at 567; Zimmer, supra note 130, at 684-85, 700;
Wilson, supra note 130, at 544-45.
137

See generally supra notes 6, 136.

138
139
140

See generally supra notes 6, 136.
See Saltzman, supra note 133; Nedrow, supra note 8.
See Bratt, supra note 134.
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scholarship,14 but surprisingly little. While this may be due to
such mundane things as the fact that commentators are rarely
motivated to write when their fundamental conclusion is that
courts are correct, it may also indicate unease with the most obvious alternative to the argument which sees marriage and family as
an exercise in autonomy, that is, one which sees the boundaries of
these rights to be set by tradition.
Is there another alternative? Is it really necessary to choose
between entirely equal constitutional protection for all types of
marriage-like relationships and no protection for them at all? If
such an alternative exists, it will require a closer examination of
the components of marriage as a legal concept and also a closer
examination of what it means to afford something protection as a
constitutional right.
V.

CLARIFYING CONCEPTS: RIGHTS AND MARRIAGE

Nonlawyers, and even lawyers speaking casually, will usually
speak of rights questions as if they pose a clear, dichotomous
choice. Either a right exists, in which case it stands as an absolute
barrier to community interference, or it does not exist, in which
case there are no restraints upon the political branches of government. Actual legal rules do not present so simple a picture. Thus,
not only are rights granted by statute obviously limited, but ancient common law rights, such as the rights to use one's property
or to exclude others from it, have their limits as well.' Even the
most widely accepted constitutional guarantees do not purport to
erect absolute barriers to government action. Instead, they increase
the burden placed on government to demonstrate that its actions
are necessary.'

141 See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 8; Maltz, supra note 8.
142 Ironically, the pre-nineteenth century era in which the right to property was considered one of "absolute dominion" was also an era in which the requirement that one
not use one's property so as to damage another's was most strictly enforced. See MORTON
J. Hoivrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-AaN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-35 (1977). For
perhaps the single most influential article on modem nuisance law, see Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One Vieu, of the
Catlwdra4 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Probably the most commonly cited modem case
on the limits of a property owner's power to exclude others is New Jersey v. Shack, 277
A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
143 Cass Sunstein begins his recent book on constitutional analysis with the principle
that "[i]n American constitutional law, government must always have a reason for what it
does. If it is distributing something to one group rather than to another, or depriving
someone of some good or benefit, it must explain itself." CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
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Traditionally, courts have imposed one of two types of burdens of justification upon government. In most cases, the legislature must only show that a challenged act rationally advances a
legitimate goal.' For the most part, courts applying this test
have defined "rationally" to mean "arguably" or "plausibly." Under
such a test, the overwhelming majority of legislation will be
valid.'45 In those cases thought to involve protected individual
rights, however, courts will demand that the legislature show that
the challenged act is "necessary," not merely potentially helpful, to
advance a "compelling" public interest.'46 When applied rigorously, this "strict scrutiny" test will invalidate most, and perhaps almost all, legislation.'47
Almost as long as these two tiers of analysis have existed,
dissatisfaction has been voiced with these options. Sometimes this
dissatisfaction has manifested itself in courts applying the tests with
different degrees of rigor in different contexts. Compare, for example, the application of "strict scrutiny" in cases involving discrimination against racial minorities,'48 with the application of
"strict scrutiny" in cases involving the free exercise of religion. 4 9
In the former cases, strict scrutiny, as might be expected, is the
CONSTITLTION 17 (1993). "Above all, the American Constitution was designed to create a
deliberative democracy ....
The minimal condition of deliberative democracy is a requirement of reasons for governmental action. We may thus understand the American
Constitution as having established, for the first time, a republic of reasons." Id. at 19-20.
144 The most important context in which this standard has been enunciated is, of
course, that of government economic regulation. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAl. Lj.W §§ 8-6 to -7 (2d ed. 1988).
145 Thus, as Professor Tribe has noted, the rational basis test has often meant "virtually complete judicial abdication." But he nevertheless notes "it is significant that the
Court never wholly abandoned the position that legislattres, at least in their regulatory
capacity, must always act in furtherance of public goals transcending the shifting summation of private interests through the political process." Id. § 8-7, at 582.
146 As the Supreme Court abandoned heightened scrntiny in economic regulation
cases, it served notice that a higher level of scrutiny might well be called for in other
contexts. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The modem strict scrutiny test was enunciated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); ironically, the racially biased statute in that case was upheld.
147 Since Korernatsu, no statute that explicitly disadvantages racial minorities has been
upheld.
148 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (finding prohibition of cross-racial
adoptions unconstitutional despite some evidence that children are subjected to unique
stress); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (holding that in the absence of clear
evidence of a threat to security, state must desegregate prisons).
149 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (application of military
dress code to prevent wearing of yarnulke upheld); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krisna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding limitations on peripatetic
fundraising at a state fair).
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practical equivalent of an absolute prohibition on government
action; in the latter cases, however, it has often seemed to be
nearly as weak a barrier as the rational basis test."'0
Perhaps a more intellectually honest approach than using the
terms but blurring the distinction between "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" has been the open search for alternative approaches.
Thus, in several contexts, "intermediate" or "heightened" scrutiny
tests have been articulated, purporting to be more rigorous than
Taking
the rational basis test, but less so than strict scrutiny.'
this one step further, Justice Marshall argued that in equal protection cases, the correct approach was not to choose one of two or
three discrete tests. Rather, he suggested a single balancing test
which would take into account the government interest involved
and the validity of creating a category of citizens with regard to
that interest.5 2 Intermediate tests or balancing tests seem to describe more accurately, much of the Court's work in resolving
rights claims, but can also be seen to increase judicial discretion
unacceptably, or at the very least, to increase unwisely the uncertainty about the scope of constitutional rights.'
Somewhat along these same lines, an apparently new analyti-

150 This consistent record of permitting government regulations to survive Free Exercise challenges led Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, to dispute whether strict scrutiny
ever had been adopted as the appropriate test. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
882-90 (1990).
151 The most notable application of "intermediate scrutiny" has been in cases of gender discrimination. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see also Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (federally mandated affirmative action); SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469 (1989) (prohibitions on commercial speech); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (total
deprivation of a benefit to illegal aliens).
152
In my view, when analyzing classifications affecting the receipt of government
benefits, a court must consider "the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
government benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in
support of the classification." By contrast, the Court's rigid, bipolar approach,
which purports to apply rational-basis scrutiny unless a suspect classification is
involved or the exercise of a fundamental right is impeded, puts legislative
classifications impinging upon sensitive issues of a family structure and survival
on the same plane as a refusal to let a merchant hawk his wares on a particular
street corner. I do not believe the equal protection component of the Due Process clause could become such a blunt instrument.
Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 644 (1986) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (citation omitted).
153 Justice Scalia has become the most influential critic of the indeterminacy of "balancing" tests. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
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cal step has recently emerged in cases considering the broad constitutional right of privacy. Justice O'Connor, in recent abortion
cases, has rejected both the contention that any statute impeding
individual choice must survive strict scrutiny and the alternative
contention that abortion is entitled to recognition only as a liberty
interest requiring application of the rational basis test to state
attempts to limit it.'54 Instead, she has put forward a framework
of analysis in which the initial inquiry is the extent to which the
challenged government act interferes with the right. If the government practice constitutes an "undue burden," strict scrutiny is applied; if not, the rational basis test will suffice.' 55 This "undue
burden" test, adopted by the three authors of the decisive joint
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 55 is now an integral part
of at least one subset of constitutional privacy jurisprudence.
In abortion cases, "[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion."'57 On the other hand, government need
not maintain neutrality regarding a woman's choice: "[u]nless it
[is an undue burden], a state measure designed to persuade [a
woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal."' 55 Thus, the exercise of the right
may be made more inconvenient or less advantageous by a state
statute surviving low-level scrutiny.' And it seems clear that government may withhold active support and assistance from a rightbearing citizen who exercises a choice disapproved of by the community."6 Only where government intervenes to impose "a sub-

154 See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459-60 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Webster v. Reproductive Health Sens., 492 U.S. 490, 530-31 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproduction Health, 462 U.S. 416,
453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 See cases cited supra note 154.
156 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
157 Id. at 2820.
158 Id. at 2821.
159 Thus, Casey upheld the requirement that a woman seeking an abortion be provided with "truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the abortion procedure,
the attendant health risks and those of childbirth," the requirement of a twenty-four
hour waiting period between providing the information and the abortion itself, and the
requirement that a minor obtain either the consent of a parent or a judicial waiver of
that consent. Id. at 2800.
160 See Harris %v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).

1994]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO MARRY

stantial obstacle" is strict scrutiny appropriate.
The "undue burden" test obviously creates analytical problems.
First and most obvious is the lack of a clear standard to determine
when an obstacle becomes "substantial..... But there are at least
two responses to this objection. The first is that a large number of
terms, in and outside of law, are highly useful despite being unclear at the margins. "Hoe' and "cold," "tall" and "short" are valuable descriptive concepts despite the absence of an accepted standard to determine where one begins and the other one ends. The
second response is more subtle and more controversial. To the
extent that one views the role of courts, especially in constitutional
cases, as unilaterally and finally ending doubt about the scope of
legislative authority, ambiguity will be seen as a vice. 62 But to
the extent that one sees constitutional analysis as a process in
which courts and legislative bodies engage in a dialogue, uncertainty may prove to be a virtue.' 63 Commentators have recently
maintained that a number of examples demonstrate that a right is
secure only when it has gained some level of acceptance from the
politically responsive branches of government, even if that acceptance is manifested only by legislative failure to act to negate court
decisions.'" Thus, racial integration, mandated by Brown v. Board
of Education,'6 5 was not secure until endorsed by the legislation of
the 1960s. Outrage over the Supreme Court's recent decisions
extending First Amendment protection to flag-burning was extinguished by Congressional refusal to reverse the decisions by constitutional amendment." 6 Many believe that the right to abortion is
161 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2866 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in
part). For a less restrained attack on the "undue burden" test, see id. at 2876-80 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (referring to the test as "a jurisprudence of confusion").
162 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 153; ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR
OF THE LAW 793 (1956) ("The job of the Court . . . is to resolve doubts, not create
them." (quoting Chief Justice Stone)).
163 Thus, Cass Sunstein believes that the Constitution requires the legislature to provide reasons for its actions. SUNSTEIN, supra note 143, at 19-20; see also Scott Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discussing the possible
virtues of having a court send a statute back to the legislature for reconsideration of its
rationality). This shared, somewhat dialogic power to evaluate the constitutionality of
legislAtion has been incorporated into the Canadian Constitution. See Donald L. Beschle,
Judicial Review and Abortion in Canada: Lesson for the United States in the Wake of Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 537 (1990).
164 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (discussing the relative role of courts and legislative bodies in changes
in civil rights, women's rights, and other areas of the law).
165 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
166 See Charles Tieffer, The Fag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress' Valid Role in
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now more secure due to political mobilization in the last few years
than it was when the right appeared to be solely dependent on
the Supreme Court. 6 '
At the same time, in each of these cases, the Court clearly
had a role to play. Had the Court not initially challenged the
status quo, the legislature would have little reason to confront the
rights question presented. The Court's role, then, need not be
limited to either issuing the final word, complete and unambiguous in all respects, or declaring that the Constitution has nothing
to say with respect to a particular question. Permitting legislative
consideration of the full contours of a right, while at the same
time maintaining strong judicial insistence that the core of that
right be protected, may increase public acceptance and legitimacy
and ultimately result in a wider range of protection.
The second objection to the undue burden test has been
articulated not only in the context of the issue of abortion, but
also with regard to a wide range of rights claims. The line between placing an obstacle and withholding a benefit is artificial. It
assumes as its baseline a present distribution of legal rights and
individual resources which itself is largely the consequence of
previous government choices, not one created in some nonpolitical or prepolitical fashion."6 This is, no doubt, a powerful argument. Yet courts have tenaciously maintained the distinction between interference with the exercise of liberty and the refusal to
assist in its exercise. Since this objection has been raised so often,
it is unlikely that this refusal is entirely due to judicial failure to
appreciate the point.
At the very least, the benefit-burden distinction, however

Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 357 (1992).

167 "See, e.g., Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Futurefor Reproductive Liberty: Strategiesfor Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RF.V. 407 (1992). While counselling both litigation and legislation-based strategies, the authors note:

The impending demise of Roe has both revitalized the pro-choice movement and
led to a critical reassessment of the efficacy of continuing the movement's near
two decade reliance on the federal courts . . . . [RIeliance on the federal courts
and the skills of lawyers will not, in the end, ensure reproductive freedom ....
[P]ublic awareness of the fact that abortion rights are in serious jeopardy has
.energized the pro-choice movement as well as the electorate.
Id. at 441.
168 Cass Sunstein is highly critical of the attitude that he calls "status quo neutrality,"
one which "disregards the fact that existing rights, and hence the status quo, are in an
important sense a product of law." SUNSTEIN, supra note 143, at 4. For Sunstein's critique, see id. at 68-92.
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philosophically suspect, seems to survive because it reflects a central point which has wide acceptance. Even if we grant the
nonneutrality of the status quo, it still strikes most of us as more
of an infringement on liberty for government to actively interfere
with an individual who is determined to act, despite -any disadvantages which the status quo presents, than for government to refuse
to adjust the status quo to help an individual. 69 That does not
make the failure to help just, nor does it deny that the
individual's plight is largely a consequence of a long chain of
government acts. It is a question of degree rather than one of the
presence or absence of restraint. Since people develop expectations based upon the status quo and since an unanticipated negative shift in the status quo is more jarring than its failure to shift
in one's favor, there would seem to be some reason to pay attention to the benefit-burden distinction.
Thus, the first step in reexamining the scope of the right to
marry or other family right is to understand that we are not limited to either rejecting the right entirely or accepting the proposition that government is precluded from all action which might
affect how the right is exercised. First of all, strict scrutiny need
not be applied in a manner which precludes government from
ever satisfying its burden, and the rational basis test may be applied with enough skepticism to assure that at least some governmental acts might fail to satisfy it. Even if one wishes to retain the
labels "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" to describe cases in
which the result is a foregone conclusion, alternate intermediate
tests exist. And, perhaps most important, the concept of "undue
burden," now an established part of at least those privacy and
autonomy cases dealing with abortion rights, may prove to be of
great help in other contexts as well.
Next, we must examine what we mean by "marriage." Like
"property," marriage may best be understood not as a single thing,
but rather as a "bundle" of things, some more closely related to

169 This instinct is reflected, for example, in the broad outlines of First Amendment
law. Prior restraint, i.e., government action which actually serves to bar the dissemination
of a message, is classically regarded as more objectionable than subsequent punishment
for speech. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NuNIMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 4.04 (1984). In turn, subsequent punishment is
held to a higher standard than government acts which regulate and consequently make
speech less convenient. Id. §§ 2.04-.05. And regulation inconveniencing speech is treated
with more suspicion than the failure of government to take positive action to assist potential speakers. Id. § 4.09.
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law than others. Like property, it may also be true that not all
commonly regarded aspects of marriage are equally important to
its essence. Most obviously, marriage is a commitment between the
parties entering it. In a typical case the commitment will include a
number of specific understandings: namely, that the relationship is
meant to be long-term, exclusive, and open to the likelihood of
procreation. The relationship will include sexual relations, cohabitation, and some degree of resource sharing. 7 ° Of course, some
parties will intend to vary from the typical case in one or more
ways, but the typical case is so clearly regarded as the norm that
those wishing to modify it will likely feel compelled to specifically
agree and set forth just how their relationship will be atypical.'
Marriage, of course, is contractual. In other times and places,
the contract might be seen as largely one between families.'72 In
contemporary America, the contract is primarily seen as one between two individuals.'73 Like other contracts, the extent to
which a particular arrangement consists of explicit or implicit
understandings that the particular case will conform to the norm
may vary. 74 But in any event, the contracting parties are the primary actors; the role of government is secondary. The law will, of
course, hold the parties to their bargain or at least assess penalties
in case of a breach. 75 But if things work out as planned, with

170

See LEVITAN & BELOUS, supra note 55, at 10-11; K. Ishwaran, Introduction to MAR-

RIAGE & DIVORCE IN CANADA 3-5 (K. Ishwaran ed., 1983).

171 For example, the title of a brief treatise on traditional marriage, prenuptial, and
"anuptial" domestic partnership agreements (Tw Law of Marriage and Marital Alternatives)
conveys the fact that traditional marriage is thought of as the norm unless the parties
adopt an "alternative." WILLIAM J. O'DONNELL & DAVID A. JONES, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE
AND MARITAL ALTERNATIVES (1982).
172 GIES & GIEs, supra note 50, at 9-10.
173 This had become the case in both England and America since 1800: "The influence of the parents in the determination of the marriage choices of their children has
all but disappeared . . . . Love has now become the only respectable and generally admitted motive for mate selection." STONE, supra note 44, at 423.
174 Prenuptial contracts altering at least the property law aspects of marriage have a
long history.
Beginning in the late sixteenth century in England a woman or her relatives
and friends could arrange a contract under which she or her trustee would
retain fill managerial rights over her separate property . . . . Women with separate estates gained protection under the rules of equity, and their husbands lost
traditional common law marital rights under which they had access to all their
wives' property.
MARYL NN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW\OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 7-8 (1986).

175 Of course, courts have become progressively less likely to hold marriages together,
or even to assess blame for the end of a marriage. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON.
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mutual understandings being clear and. those understandings being carried out, the law need not actively intervene. But law will
also set limits on the types of agreements it will enforce.
Moreover, it may declare certain types of agreements not only
unenforceable, but also illegal.' Clearly, the latter type of government activity is a greater intrusion into the liberty of the contracting parties than the former, but the decision not to enforce
may also have significance.
To the extent that marriage is a contract, law will inevitably
be involved, even if that involvement is only secondary. But to
many, the core meaning of marriage goes beyond mere contract.
For such persons, marriage is a sacrament. 7 7 Despite centuries of
progressive secularization of the marital relationship, even those
who are not members of religions which formally recognize marriage as sacramental tend to infuse the marriage contract with
values which transcend those found in other agreements. 78
These values, which are basically a set of commitments going beyond the mutual agreement to carry out the minimal contract
obligations, are not a likely field for government involvement.
How can government enforce an open-ended commitment or
require love?
Yet, intangible as it may be, law seems to play a role here.
While the marriage commitment may not be enforceable beyond
its contractual elements, societies have adopted ceremonies designed to recognize and honor the commitment. The religious
ceremony in which the relationship is blessed and given official
approval by the parties' religious community is, of course, the
most obvious. But where there is no established or even common
national religion, the need for a substitute type of community
"blessing" may become evident. Those who find that religious or
other types of "blessings" are unavailable may strongly value the
legitimacy conferred upon their relationship by some sort of offi-

But this seems to be less a matter of
not enforcing the parties' expectations than a recognition of the fact that marriage is
less likely to be seen as an irrevocable lifetime commitment.
176 See, e.g., Brown -. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. 1968) (holding void
and unenforceable a lease attempting to convey premises burdened with substantial housing code violations).
177 This theme is most prominent in Roman Catholic theology. See Geoffrey Robinson, Unresolved Questions in the Theology of Mariage 43 JURIST 69, 97-102 (1983).
178 For a discussion of the interaction of different religious conceptions of marriage
with legal approaches to marriage, see Witte, supra note 59.

ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAWV(1987).
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cial government recognition.'79
But if government's role in conferring symbols of legitimacy is
somewhat intangible and its role in supervising the contractual elements of marriage only secondary, there remains an aspect of
marriage which is utterly dependent on law. This encompasses the
wide range of benefits which government confers on those who
enter the relationship. The most obvious example is favorable tax
treatment, but other rewards and incentives can easily be added to
the list.'
These benefits are clearly not "natural" or
"prepolitical" attributes of marriage and they go beyond the mutual benefits which might be achieved by contract or by unilateral
decisions about the disposition of property. 8 ' Government is
quite clearly the source, not merely the guarantor, of these benefits.
Thus, neither the notion of what it means to violate a right
nor the notion of what marriage means is as simple or unitary as
it might seem. Having isolated the different aspects of the legal
concept of marriage and the different types of burdens which the
Constitution places on government when it seeks to act in ways
which impact individual rights, we can now suggest an approach to
the notions of family and marriage rights which is more nuanced
than either of the most commonly articulated alternatives.
VI.

FAMILY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO MARRY: SETTING LIMITS

By isolating the several aspects of the legal concept of marriage and by clarifying that different levels of protection may be
afforded to different aspects of a right, we can discuss both the
right to form a family and the right to marry in a way which recognizes the existence of these rights, yet rejects the position that
government may not favor one form of family over another. Several principles assist this discussion. First, the emergence of the concept of "undue burdens" provides a useful analytical tool for ad-

179 Thus, after listing the concrete disadvantages of unmarried couples in the legal
system, Claudia Lewis states: "More importantly, [alternatives to marriage] cannot provide
the psychological benefits of state-blessed marriage: the enhanced respectability of the
loving relationship and its acceptance in the wider community." Lewis, supra note 8, at
1795.
180 For a list of legal and economic benefits available to married persons, see
Ingram, supra note 6, at 36.
181 For a discussion of legal alternatives to marriage and the extent to which they
fall short of the full "bundle of rights inherent in marriage," see Zimmer, supra note
130, at 688-97.
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justing the level of court scrutiny of majoritarian decisions commensurate with the degree to which those decisions interfere with
an individual's life. When the state places an undue burden on
liberty with respect to family matters, strict scrutiny is appropriate.
But when the state merely endorses and rewards one type of individual choice over another without actively interfering with those
who choose the disfavored option, the rational basis test suffices.
Second, we should remember that neither strict scrutiny nor
the rational basis test need be applied in a way which makes a
certain outcome inevitable. While it ,may not happen very often,
sometimes government acts in a narrowly focused way to address
an interest which is genuinely compelling. And while it may also
not happen very often, sometimes government conduct will not be
justified as rationally related to a legitimate purpose. 2 In applying these tests, it is important to recognize that families are usually intergenerational entities. Therefore, we can expect that the
protection of vulnerable family members (often, but not always,
children) and the community's interest in the welfare of the next
generation will be the most commonly asserted government interests.
Finally, in assessing whether an undue burden exists, as well
as in applying the appropriate level of scrutiny, we should keep in
mind the two types of liberty discussed in Part I: the liberty to act
in an entirely self-regarding way and the liberty to override government interests in order to fulfill duties to someone or something
recognized as having an equal or higher claim on the individual.
The failure to recognize the degree to which family rights are of
the latter type, rather than of the former, may explain much of
the difficulty in delineating the scope of these rights.
A. PrincipleI: The Right to Form a Family Should be
Analyzed Differently Than the Right to Avoid Family Entanglements
Both the right to marry and form a family and the right to
avoid family entanglements through such means as contraception
and abortion grew out of the same rather amorphous concept: a
right to privacy.'8 3 Because of this, it is easy to conclude that the
analysis of each of these rights should proceed in exactly the same
way, that is, these are not separate rights at all, but merely differ-
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See, e.g., City of Cleburne %vCleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
See supra notes 68-125 and accompanying text.
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ent applications of the single right of privacy.'8 4 Certainly, the
right to form a family and the right to avoid doing so are closely
related. Since they both arise out of what is commonly designated
the "substantive" part of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, they are both subject to the same broad type of analytical
inquiry: Does a challenged government act place an undue burden
on the right, and, if it does, does it survive strict scrutiny? But in
applying strict scrutiny or its alternative, the rational basis test, the
distinctive nature of the rights should be taken into account.
The fundamental difference between the right to form a family unit and the right to avoid doing so is that the former is the
right to assume an important type of duty. Much like the right of
free exercise of religion, at its core the right to form a family,
while it no doubt yields significant personal satisfaction and even
tangible benefits, is a response to the demands of another, a commitment beyond the self. Just as the Court is skeptical' 5 of free
exercise claims which appear to be insincere attempts to gain
personal advantage, courts must be skeptical of those who assert
family rights in an attempt to achieve entirely selfish ends. Thus,
the cloak of the family cannot be allowed to shield abusive behavior toward spouse and children.' Feminist and other critiques
of family privacy are justified in fearing that it may be used to
protect exploitation." 7 Such misapplication is possible because of
the easy analogy between family rights, which are grounded in
concepts of commitment and duty to others, and a range of other
rights which are not dependent upon anything beyond individual
welfare. When a claim of a family right is not plausibly grounded
in the need to fulfill a duty to another, it loses much, if not all,

184 Perhaps this can be traced back to Justice Brandeis, who described privacy as "the
right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Can something so "comprehensive" be usefully analyzed as a single entity at all?
185 See supra notes 3340 and accompanying text.
186 Of course, through much of history, the law has ignored, if not permitted, the
abuse of wives and children. See WILI.iAM A. STACEY' & ANSON D. SHUPE, THE FAMILY
SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 9-22 (1983). This fact alone should give pause to

those who would frame family rights based solely on tradition. Fortunately, family violence is now recognized as a serious social problem. See generally JOHN M. EEKELAAR &
SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY
(1978); KENIMER, supra note 61.
187 Cf Constance Backhouse, "PnrePatriarchy": Nineteenth-Century Canadian Marriage, 31
MCGILL LJ. 264 (1986) (explaining that Canadian courts used longstanding common law
concepts to resist legislative change from the patriarchal to the companionate model of
marriage).
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of its reason for being.
The right to avoid family entanglements, on the other hand,
can be properly exercised for entirely self-regarding reasons. While
it may be possible to imagine particular situations in which the
use of birth control, or even abortion, arguably might be seen by
a woman as a duty,"s such a duty is clearly unnecessary to the
fundamental nature of the right. Some find this distinction dangerous, in that it might suggest that the right to avoid family entanglements, being less noble than the less self-regarding right to
form a family, should be under-enforced. 89 But this suggestion
does not follow at all. In fact, given the gravity of the commitment
to family, which is respected by the recognition of a right to discharge that commitment, the individual must be given a strong
right to avoid commitments of that nature which are not undertaken voluntarily. And coercion to enter a parent-child relationship
is as much a mandate for involuntary families as a regime of
forced marriage would be. While the analogy is surely imperfect,
once again the First Amendment suggests an example. While the
Free Exercise Clause respects those who choose to assume religious duties, the Establishment Clause assures that no one will be
forced into such a commitment by government.' The argument
for a strong Free Exercise Clause does not necessarily advocate a
weak Establishment Clause. The rights, while no doubt related, are
still analytically distinct in crucial ways, and this recognition need
not lead to sacrificing either for the other.'

188 See Robin West, Forevord: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79-85
(1990). Professor West argues that pro-choice advocates should reframe their arguments
to focus on the extent to which "the decision to abort is almost invariably made within a
web of interlocking, competing, and often irreconcilable responsibilities and commitments." i. at 85.
189 Similarly, commentators on recent attempts to revive communitarian thought in
constitutional law are wary of the changes it may pose to hard-won individual rights. See,
e.g., Lawrence Friedman, Commentary on the Confrence, 21 CONN. L. REv. 1013 (1989);
James W. Torke, What Price Belonging? An Essay on Groups, Community and the Constitution,
24 IND. L. REv. 1, 22-28 (1990) (invoking "the ghost of Robespierre" to develop the view
that communitarian thought has its costs).
190 Cf. David Little, Roger Williams and the Separation of Church and State, in RELIGION
AND THE STATE: EssAvs IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER (1985)

(explaining that Roger Wil-

liams, a seminal figure in American history on separation of church and state, sought
separation not to lead a life free of religion, but to freely pursue the course demanded
by his own conscience).
191 Thus, Justices Brennan and Marshall generally took separationist positions in Establishment Clause cases. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Yet Justices Brennan and Marshall generally took a libertarian position in free exercise cases. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith,
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Thus, the right to form a family and the right to avoid family
entanglements, while related, are two separate concepts. They
need not rise or fall together, nor do they present some sort of
zero-sum game in which one is strengthened only at the expense
of the other. Since the right to avoid family entanglements quite
legitimately does not depend upon the willingness to perform a
duty to others, but rather may be exercised entirely to promote
the self, it will have limited relevance to an analysis of the right to
form family relationships. Similarly, our analysis of the right to
form family relationships will provide little help in setting the
boundaries of the right to avoid such entanglements.
B.

Principle II: Undue Burdens on the Right to Form Family
Relationships Should Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny

How, then, do we recognize undue burdens, as distinguished
from mere regulation? The first step may be taken directly from
the abortion cases. 2 An attempt to criminalize or prohibit an
act is clearly an undue burden. At the other extreme, withholding
active assistance or community approval clearly is not.'9 3 Between
these two relatively clear cases fall government actions which make
the act more difficult; hence, the question is much less clear. Even
so, the relatively clear aspects of the undue burden equation suggest a number of relatively clear conclusions as well as an overall
constitutional approach to the right to form a family which will
provide somewhat more protection than is currently the case, but
less than some might advocate.
If commitment and a sense of duty are at the core of the
concept of family, the main focus of inquiry should be on the
extent of interference by government with private choices to make
such a commitment. Perhaps the most obvious examples here
entail the parent-child relationship, since the tangible and legal
duties imposed on the parent are so clear and are accompanied
by benefits and satisfactions which, while undoubtedly real, are less
concrete. For the most part, current law recognizes the choice to
have a child, at least through biological means, as a fundamental
right. 4 And some cases not dealing directly with procreative

494 U.S. 872, 907 (1990) (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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rights also seem to recognize the principle. Redhai4lt95 for example, while normally seen as a case concerning the right to marry,
also had some strong overtones of the parent-child relationship as
well.
The plaintiff in Redhail was seeking to marry a woman with
whom he was expecting a child. 9 In other words, he was seeking not only to create a husband-wife relationship, but also to
assume immediately the legal and practical burdens of parenthood. While biological paternity would also impose legal obligations upon him, his willingness to formally assume the role of
father as well as husband surely made his rights claims more compelling.
If the "undue burdens" approach is accepted, it may require
serious rethinking of the way in which courts should address at
least some conflicts between biological parents and foster parents, 9 7 adoptive parents, 9 ' and perhaps even parents who have
contracted for the services of a "surrogate mother." 99 Recent cases indicate great judicial deference to biological ties."' But if the
essence of family is commitment, the claims of nonbiological parents, at least those who have clearly demonstrated assumption of
duties of care, are entitled to a strong showing before they are
stripped of their status as parents.'
Of course, this does not
mean that biological parents will always lose those contests. The
welfare of the child no doubt provides a compelling interest for
government concern, and in some cases the severance of parental
ties will be closely enough linked to that end to satisfy strict scrutiny. And certainly in some cases, both biological and nonbiological
parents will have an equally demonstrated commitment to the

195 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
196 Id. at 379.
197 See generally Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 149 (1980); Vincent S. Nadile, Note, Promoting the Integrity of Foster Family Relationships: Needed Statutory
Protectionsfor Foster Parents, 62 NoTRE DAME L. RE. 221 (1987).
198 See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMIIX BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING (1993); Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents, Substance or Specter?, 38 U.C.L.A. L. RE%. 917 (1991).199 See generally Anita L. Allen, Surrogaty, Slavery and the Ownership of Life 13 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. POLi' 139 (1990); Colloquy, Some Reflections on the Baby M. Case, 76 GEO. LJ.
1793 (1988).
200 See generally sources cited supra notes 197-99.
201 Elizabeth Bartholet criticizes the notion that nonbiological parenting relationships
are clearly less desirable than biological relationships. BARTHOLET, supra note 198, at 16486.
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than biology, as the basis of the parental right.
In examining the marriage commitment, its mutuality may
obscure its existence, at least compared to the relatively one-sided
parent-child commitment. But mutuality does not negate the real
existence of duty, nor does the undoubted fact that many enter
the relationship in bad faith or with purely selfish expectations. As
is true in contract law, these considerations may lead in individual
cases to rejection of a party's claims, but they do not cause the
law to, a priori, deny the legitimacy of mutual commitment in the
notion of contracts in general.
Some aspects of mutual commitment are intangible and,
therefore, beyond any potential reach of government. But at least
two manifestations of mutual commitment, the decision to share
living quarters and the decision to have sexual relations, have long
been the subject of government attention. These decisions are
surely at the core of any conception of marriage; the former is at
the core of any conception of family. These types of decisions are
possible regardless of the existence of any particular legal regime.
To the extent that anything may be properly so described, they
seem to be prepolitical 2" This leads to the conclusion that any
government attempt to criminalize the decision to live together, or
the decision to have sexual relations in a voluntary noncommercial
setting, should be subjected to strict scrutiny. This suggests that
the polygamy cases were wrongly decided," 3 as was Bowers v.
Hardwick insofar as it extended government power to homosexuals
living in a relationship and demonstrating genuine commitment to
each other.
This alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all
sexual partners will be able to invoke strict scrutiny against state
interference, but it does not exclude the possibility either. Casual
sexual partners may not claim protection as part of the right to
form a family. But as pointed out above, their autonomy claims

202 Of course, too ready an acceptance of the notion of rights as natural and prepolitical can easily lead to the sort of "status quo neutrality" criticized by Cass Sunstein.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 143, at 68-92. Still, those who would extend constitutional protection to alternative family arrangements frequently argue that these arrangements have a
very long history, predating even the common law. See, e.g., Nedrow, supra note 8, at 30506 ("The practice of polygamy is as old as man himself."); Damslet, supra note 56, at 559
("Certainly by the time of recorded marriage history, historians find an 'ancient and powerful tradition of same-sex marriage."').
203 See supra note 33. Polygamy as a legal problem is not merely of historical interest.
See Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Utah 1984), modifled 760 F.2d 1065
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849 (1985).
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are not to be conflated with family rights claims, but should be
treated separately. 2°4 The right to form a family, by itself, will not
establish that Bowers was incorrect in its entirety, but it will serve
to limit its scope.
The two principal Supreme Court decisions involving the right
of government to limit the ability to live together provide holdings
that are roughly consistent with the rules suggested by our principles. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,205 a zoning ordinance restricting those who could live in "one-family" dwellings to groups
containing no more than two unrelated adults was upheld as satisfying the rational basis test.20 6 The ordinance had been challenged by a group of college students who wished to share a
house. 7 In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,0 8 the Court applied
strict scrutiny and struck down an ordinance which limited the
number of blood relatives beyond the "nuclear family" who could
share quarters in a single-family zoned district.2 1 While the Moore
decision focuses on biology and tradition more than the existence
of a long-term commitment between the parties, these decisions
do seem to recognize that a transient or short-term relationship
entered into primarily out of self-interest is entitled to less respect
than an open-ended relationship with strong overtones of mutual
210
duty.
Thus, attempts to criminalize or prohibit voluntary decisions
to live together or decisions to have sexual relations by adults who
intend to make a personal commitment to each other, roughly
comparable to that entailed by traditional marriage, should be
subject to strict scrutiny. But liberty has long been seen to include
not only the absence of legal restraints, but also some degree of
legal respect for private arrangements. In the absence of a strong
reason to believe that a contract offends public policy, the state
will enforce private arrangements. 2 1' The same should be true

204 See supra notes 42-67 and accompanying text.
205 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
206 Id. at 8-10.
207 Id. at 2-3.
208 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
209 Id. at 498-99.
210 In Belle Terre, the Court found it worth noting that the ordinance did permit two
unmarried people to constitute a "family." Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8. This suggests that
more scrutiny may have been imposed had the statute attempted to exclude those whose
liing arrangements demonstrated a greater degree of commitment than that of college
roommates.
211 And, of course, a long history of arguments suggest that enforcement of such
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when the agreement in question serves to achieve partially the
state of reciprocal duties and benefits associated with marriage.
Any attempt by the state to void such agreements should bear the
burden of satisfying strict scrutiny. Thus, property sharing arrangements, testamentary provisions, powers of attorney, and a
wide range of legal relations which automatically accompany marriage are open to those in nontraditional relationships.
For the most part, this principle will not change existing law.
Individuals' rights to arrange their own affairs as to their own
property are well recognized. But it may have some effect at the
fringes of this type of law. For example, guardianship by a longterm partner over an adult who becomes incompetent should not
be precluded in favor of guardianship by blood relatives merely
212
because of the existence of a nontraditional relationship.
Where adults seek only to order their own lives, it would be an
undue burden to preclude them from doing so.
C. Principle Ii: The Rational Basis Test is Appropriatefor Regulation
of Families Which Does Not Place an Undue Burden on the
Right to Form Them
Much of what government does with respect to families will
not constitute an undue burden on the right to form them. Most
important, the decisions to give official recognition, beyond tolerance and noninterference, to a particular type of family and not
to others and to provide benefits to encourage one type of family
over others do not call for strict scrutiny. As will be discussed
below, this does not mean that the decision is per se valid, but it
need be justified only as rational.
Thus, when government decides to favor monogamy by limiting the number of spouses who will be recognized as such for
purposes of tax exemptions or other government benefits, it raises

agreements is a constitutional right. See Symposium, Liberty and Justice for All: Protecting
Individual Rights Under the Constitution, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 753 (1989). For a discussion
of the rise of the Contract Clause in the nineteenth century, see James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to
Substantive Right Against the State, 31 BUFF. L. RE.'. 381 (1982).
212 Contra In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(upholding the appointment of a father instead of a companion as guardian of a physically and mentally impaired woman), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986). For commentary,
see Amy L. Brown, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for
Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1029 (1990).
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far fewer concerns than when government criminalizes private
polygamous arrangements. Likewise, the fact that those who enter
traditional marriages receive a number of legal benefits in a sort
of "one-stop shopping," while those who do not may achieve such
goals only through a less convenient, more cumbersome process of
contracts, wills, and other private agreements, does not rise to the
level of an undue burden on liberty.
Nor is strict scrutiny appropriate when government merely
refuses to bestow its "blessing" on relationships by officially designating them "marriages." Undoubtedly, refusing to extend official recognition as a "marriage" to disfavored living arrangements
indicates a lack of strict neutrality on the part of government. But
apart from the unique concerns of the Establishment Clause,"'
the Constitution places few restrictions on government preference
of one way of life over another." 4 What it does concern itself
with is active government interference with the liberty of individuals to go their own way.
A wide range of government acts, then, which serve to limit
those who can gain formal recognition as being married or which
make it more convenient or more beneficial to choose one form
of family over another, will not constitute undue burdens and do
not call for strict scrutiny. But that does not mean that they will
all be justifiable.
D. Principle IV- Strict Scrutiny Does Not Mean Per Se Illegality; The
Rational Basis Test Does Not Mandate Per Se Legality
It must be stressed that the decision of which standard to
apply does not end the constitutional inquiry; government may
satisfy the strict scrutiny test, and it may fail to satisfy the rational
basis test. This is clearly so in theory, but there are also examples
of it being true in fact as well. In certain contexts, most notably
instances where government adopts a racial classification which
to apply strict
disadvantages
minorities," 5 the decision

" U.S.
213 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....
CONST. amend. 1. See generally RE1IGION AND THE STATE, supra note 190.
214 See Donald L. Beschle, Conditional Spending and the First Amendment: Maintaining the
Commitment to Rational Liberal Dialogue 57 MO. L. REv. 1117 (1992) (arguing that the type
of neutrality called for by the Establishment Clause is not demanded of government on a
broad range of value choices).
215 See supra notes 146-48 and accompan)ing text.
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scrutin 1 has been the equivalent of a decision to invalidate the
practice. But in other contexts, this has not been the case. During
the 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court upheld a number of
government practices against Free Exercise Clause challenges, in
each case after applying strict scrutiny. Of course, in these cases
and others in which strict scrutiny was satisfied,1 dissenters have
complained that the label was used to describe something less
stringent," 8 but the fact remains that some government interests
are compelling and some practices are the least restrictive ways of
satisfying them. Occasional misapplications do not call for adoption of a per se rule of illegality. And if per se rules are desired,
should they not be adopted explicitly?
If it is easy to believe that strict scrutiny actually means per se
illegality, it may be even easier to believe that the decision to
apply the rational basis test is a decision in favor of per se legality.
And the Supreme Court has come closer to endorsing this position than the position that strict scrutiny is invariably fatal. Most
recently, in FCC v. Beach Communications,"9 the Court stated:
Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred
from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness or logic of legislative choices. In
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification
that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.
Where there are "plausible reasons" for Congress' action, "our
inquiry is at an end."
This standard of review is a paradigm of
220
judicial restraint.
While this specifically addresses the Equal Protection Clause,

216 See supra note 149.
217 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (upholding affirmative
action plan); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (same); United States v.
The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (upholding prior restraint on
publication of information related to nuclear weapons).
218 See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 196-97 ("The plurality today purports to apply strict
scrutiny, and concludes that the order in this case was narrowly tailored ....
[But] the
Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far less stringent than that required by strict scrutiny.") (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503, 528 (1986) ("No test for free exercise claims in the military context is even articulated [in this case], much less applied.") (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
219 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993).
220 Id. at 2101 (citations omitted).
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there is little reason to believe that the rational basis test is applied with much more rigor under the Due Process Clause. Still,
there are limits. In this same opinion, the Court goes on to affirm
its faith in the democratic process "absent some reason to infer
antipathy."2 2 ' Thus, there are some illegitimate state purposes;
simple hostility to a group of citizens is one of them. In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,222 without applying strict scrutiny, the Court overturned a zoning restriction insofar as it prevented groups of mentally retarded men and women from occupying a
group home. A government act found "to rest223on an irrational
prejudice" would fail even the rational basis test.
Similarly, the usual deference to legislatures with respect to
their motives has been absent in a number of Establishment
Clause cases.224 Here, of course, the Constitution clearly cautions
against government acts Vihich are religious, i.e., nonrational, and
225
so the skepticism embodied in these cases is not surprising.
But along with Cleburne and the plain language of the rational
basis test, this suggests that there is some burden on government
to do more than assert that its act is supported by the majority of
citizens and, therefore, rationally pursues legitimate ends. Some
minimal effort must be made to rebut the notion that naked hostility or entirely nonrational reasons are all that underlie the challenged restriction."'
The reason for judicial reluctance to find that an act of government ever fails to satisfy the rational basis test seems obvious;
courts do not wish to return to the era of Lochner - 7 Yet Lochner's
fatal flaws should not obscure two points. First, even Holmes and
the three other Lochner dissenters conceded that government was
required to legislate rationally. 28 Their conception of when that
221 Id. (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
222 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
223 Id. at 450.
224 For Establishment Clause cases in which the motives of the legislature were sharply questioned, see Church of Lukumi Bakalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); and Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985).
225 See supra notes 213-14.
226 "The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal
is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. Furthermore, some
objectives-such as 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group'-are not
legitimate state interests." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47
(citations omitted).
227 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
228 "[I]n determining the question of power to interfere with liberty of contract, the
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requirement was satisfied was surely different than that of the
majority, but it did not include the total absence of evidence that
the act advanced the general welfare. 29 Second, it would seem
that the consequence of government failing to meet the rational
basis test or, for that matter, strict scrutiny,"' is not final preclusion of government activity. Rather, it is that government, if it still
wishes to act, must produce a greater justification for that action.3 ' In some cases, this will be impossible, but in others, it
will not be.252 Thus, putting some teeth into the rational basis
test need not disempower the political branches. Rather, it may do
no more than insist that they act with proper regard for rational
argument.
How should all this apply in cases of family rights? The protection of family members from abuse and exploitation will assuredly qualify as a compelling state interest. Recognition of the right
to form a family need not, therefore, disempower government
from actions narrowly tailored to prevent such abuse. This principle has its most obvious applications within already formed families, but it has some relevance with respect to the right to form
families as well. For example, some prohibitions against incestuous
marriages (e.g., those involving minors) and requirements of a
minimum age for marriage should be seen to satisfy strict scrutiny.
But where the parties are mature and there is no evidence of
exploitation, it will be much harder for government to establish
that the prohibition of cohabitation, sexual relations, or the refusal to respect private arrangements involving the sharing of property or other aspects of life satisfy strict scrutiny.
When government goes beyond merely preventing abuse to
create conditions which it believes will promote the welfare of
citizens, particularly future generations, it is acting, at the very
least, for legitimate reasons. Thus, preferences for particular family

court may inquire whether the means devised by the State are germane to an end which
may be lawfully accomplished ...
." Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Because "[a] reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score of health," Justice Holmes
believed that the statute should be upheld. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
229 Courts should give great deference to legislation, yet at the same time "guard the
constitutional rights of the citizen against merely arbitrary power." Id. at 74 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
230 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
231 See Bice, supra note 163.
232 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973).
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forms, which do not rise to the level of unduly burdening those
who choose alternatives, need to be supported by some credible
evidence that the favored forms do promote such ends. But here
there need be no consensus; as in the views of Lochner's dissenters,
there need only be evidence to dispel the notion that the
government's choice is entirely arbitrary.
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to review the
social science evidence with respect to the relative advantages of
different family forms or to prescribe specific outcomes for the
application of the proposed tests in specific cases. But in general,
it would seem fair to say that the current state of the evidence is
largely mixed.3 3 In light of this, it is likely that most undue burdens will be struck down and that most actions short of undue
burdens will be upheld. A few examples may help illustrate this.
First, corisider legislative prohibitions on the adoption of children by gay or lesbian parents.' As absolute prohibitions on the
creation of a family relationship, these would constitute undue
burdens and be subject to strict scrutiny. Government would no
doubt claim that the prohibitions further the welfare of the
child.3 5 But under strict scrutiny, government would have the
additional burden of clearly demonstrating that such adoptions
were more harmful than alternatives. A review of currently
avail35
able evidence suggests that this burden cannot be met.

Second, consider a legislative decision to formally recognize
only heterosexual unions as "marriages." This act does not unduly
burden the liberty of homosexuals to live as couples, so it would
be subject only to the rational basis test. Government would likely
argue that it privileges heterosexual marriages because such marriages are far more likely to involve raising children than homosexual marriages. The fit between ends and means is imperfect
here; some homosexual unions will devote themselves to raising
children, while some heterosexual marriages will not. Under strict

233 See COONTz, supra note 43, at 207-231; RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 18789 (1992) (social policy encouraging traditional marriages may increase social welfare, but
evidence is not conchsive); Nancy Moore Clatworthy, The Non-Traditional Family and the
Child, 12 CAP. U. L. REV. 345 (1983).
234 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 63.042(3) (1991), discussed in Camille L. Worsnop, The
F7orida Statute ProhibitingAdoption by Homosexuals in View of Seebal v. Farie: Expressly Unconstitutional 16 NOVA L. RE'. 983 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (1987), discussed
in Ali, supra note 128, at 1026-29.
235 See Ali, supra note 128, at 1013-21.
236 Id.
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scrutiny, therefore, this justification fails, as several commentators
3 7
have pointed out.Y
But under the rational basis test, it does

not. Enough evidence exists to justify a legislative conclusion that
by preferring heterosexual over homosexual unions, the state advances the welfare of children under this less restrictive test.
Finally, consider the question of polygamy. The nineteenth
century cases upholding the government's power to criminalize
polygamy justify such condemnation by referring to the "patriarchal" nature of polygamy."' Some historical and sociological evidence exists linking polygamy with gender inequality; it would
seem that a rational legislature could disfavor it on those
grounds. 39 But the amount of gender inequality in monogamous
cultures makes the connection between polygamy and inequality
somewhat murky. Thus, the criminalization of the arrangement
seems unlikely to survive strict scrutiny.
Most government practices subjected to strict scrutiny will
likely fail, while most of those subjected only to the rational basis
test will survive. But the fact that these outcomes are not automatic, but rather the consequence of reflection on government's ends
and means, is significant. Particularly in an area like family law,
where emotional reactions and religious sentiments are so prominent, the reminder that the legislative process must be justified by
some degree of rational argument is worth repeating.
E. Principle V: Legislatures Are Free To Provide A Greater Measure of
Protection Than That Constitutionally Required
This principle is obviously true, yet often neglected in commentary regarding constitutional rights. By declaring the existence
of rights and some degree of protection for them, courts need not

237 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
238 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) (describing bigamy and polygamy as
"degrad[ing] to women"); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)
("[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and . . .when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism . . . ."). Surely the Court may be criticized for ignoring the extent of patriarchal control over women permitted in nineteenth
century monogamous relationships. Still, is it not clear that government may promote
more equalitarian family relationships over those that are less so?
239 Nineteenth century feminists were generally opposed to polygamy. Some attacked
it as a threat to monogamy, while others, skeptical or hostile to traditional monogamous
marriage, "would occasionally view its evils as merely relative." Carole Weisbrod & Pamela
Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Centuty Forms of Marriage and the Status of
Women, 10 CONN. L. REv. 828, 841 (1978).
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claim for themselves the last word on the scope of these rights. Indeed, too doctrinaire an approach may in the long run erode
public support for rights. At the same time, it may convince legislators that they need not concern themselves with rights issues,
since that is the province of the courts, but rather that they may
respond to any manifestation of majority sentiment.24
By leaving the precise contours of a particular right unclear,
courts invite the legislature not only to consider shrinking them,
but also to consider expanding them. Racial equality was advanced
in the 1950s and 1960s by courts and legislatures together, with
legislatures often exceeding the minimum requirements set by
courts.24' Many contend that the recent retrenchment by the
Court concerning abortion rights has ultimately made the right
more secure by energizing political support for it.242 In the long
run, it is unlikely that any controversial right will be secure absent
some degree of popular acceptance, and popular acceptance is
unlikely to come from judicial proceedings alone.
Thus, the conclusion that nontraditional marriages need not
be recognized as equal to traditional marriages does not establish
that they should not be. In light of the discussion in Parts II and
III, an argument surely can be made that the community should
recognize and reward genuine commitment to others, whether or
not manifested in traditional family forms.2 4 Advocates of expanding benefits and recognition to nontraditional families would
be well advised not to rely exclusively on the language of rights
and individualism. Rather, they should explain how their own
choices, which strike so many as offensive, actually resemble the
commitment to others manifested, at least in theory, in the traditional family. In the context of family, as in the context of religion, an argument which does not speak in terms only of self is
likely to be given more respectful consideration.

240 See Abner J. Mikva & Joseph R. Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38
U. CHI. L. REv. 449 (1971) (discussing Congress's attitude toward constitutional issues
presented by pending legislation).
241 See ROSENBERG, supra note 164, at 39-173.
242 See Pine & Law, supra note 167, at 441.
243 Thus, the arguments of those who consider fill recognition of nontraditional
forms of marriage to be constitutionally compelled, supnra notes 6 and 130, surely deserve
a hearing on the question of whether legislative bodies should bring about reforms, even
if not constitutionally required to do so.
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CONCLUSION

Those who deny that the Constitution extends any protection
to those who wish to form nontraditional families and those who
insist that the Constitution commands strict government neutrality
among family structures oversimplify the matter. Much of this
confusion may arise from the belief that these are the only available alternatives, with advocacy of one being the inevitable consequence of rejection of the other. But the concept of undue burdens, developed in recent abortion cases, suggests that this is not
the case.
Much of the discussion on the right to form families also
suffers from the assumption that this right is one that may legitimately be claimed for entirely self-regarding reasons. While this is
true of most constitutional rights, the right to form a family, much
like the right to free exercise of religion, is intimately caught up
in the notion of commitment and duty to another. This explains
why family rights cannot be used as a shield permitting spousal or
child abuse; where protection is sought for acts which patently
violate the commitment which is at the core of the family, there is
no reason to respect the claim of right. When an individual seeks
to make a commitment to another, even where mutuality assures
that the individual will receive something in return, that person
has a powerful claim to noninterference by government. Absent
some compelling reason, such as the clear presence of exploitation, government prohibition of such arrangements or refusal to
respect contractual commitments creating family-like commitments
should be invalid.
But the community has always and will likely continue to
come to the conclusion that some forms of family are more beneficial to the community, over time, than others. Much of social science is devoted to exploring ways of maximizing the welfare of
children; it is unrealistic and unwarranted to demand that government ignore this work. Thus, the Constitution is not violated
when the government, on the basis of rational evidence, decides
to provide positive incentives, including formal recognition, to
certain family forms and not to others.
Under these rules, a significant core of individual liberty is
protected, while at the same time the question of what types of
families should be encouraged is preserved as a legitimate subject
of political discussion. Societies have given different answers at different times to this question. There is much reason to think that
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attitudes will continue to change, in light of evidence that nontraditional forms of commitment are better for the community than
the option of encouraging no commitment at all from those who
reject the norm. But here as elsewhere, not all decisions which
might be wise are constitutionally compelled.

